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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the effects of government ownership on financial 
performance within the seafood industry. Looking at the period of 2005-2012 we measure 
financial performance using Tobin’s Q and return on assets. Our dataset consists of quarterly 
data from eleven companies listed on the Oslo Seafood Index. Using an econometrical 
approach we are not able to conclude that government ownership is associated with 
significantly negative performance. These findings are in line with previous studies on 
government ownership in Norway. However, we find that government ownership has a 
significant positive effect on return on assets during periods when EBIT-margins are low.
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Foreword 
Government ownership is frequently debated in Norway. The issue is closely related to our 
vast natural resources, and how these should be controlled in order to benefit the society in 
the best way possible. The Government has until now chosen to solve this, primarily through 
regulation and direct ownership.  
Our motivation for writing this paper is a direct consequence of the fight for control we 
witnessed in Cermaq over the last couple of months. The Government has defined this as a 
commercially motivated investment, meaning that there in reality should be no other reasons 
for the investment, other than the wish to maximize profit. It was therefore interesting to 
note that the Government played such an active part, when Cermaq was attempted acquired 
by Marine Harvest earlier this year. The Government was vocal about their opinion and 
finally The Ministry of Trade and Industry increased their ownership to almost 60 percent by 
purchasing shares close to the offer-price, which it previously had deemed inadequate. 
We hope that this paper will be as interesting to read, as it was for us writing it. While 
working, issues regarding Government ownership have often made headlines. Most recently 
in association with the controversial Aker Wayfarer transaction between Aker Solutions and 
Aker ASA. It has been truly exiting to work with such a relevant topic. 
We would very much like to thank our brilliant supervisor, Martin Evanger, who has given 
us valuable feedback throughout the whole process. He has constantly both challenged us 
and pointed us in the right direction. 
 
Bergen, December 2013 
 
 
___________________________    ___________________________ 
             Aksel Hjall Thue                        Carl C. Tybring-Gjedde 
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1. Introduction 
Norway is in a different situation than other European countries with regards to the 
magnitude of government ownership. While the international trend is a reduction it is 
consistently the subject of public debate in Norway with the attitude fluctuating in line with 
changes in society and the political landscape (Øyum and Torvatn, 2010).  
1.1 Background 
Historically, the main reason for government ownership in Norway has been the limited 
availability of capital. Following the Second World War, an insufficient domestic capital 
market made the government supply the long-term capital necessary for industrial 
development. Investments such as Årdal and Sunndal Verk (1947) and Norsk Jernverk 
(1955), which in other countries would most likely be carried out by the private sector, were 
made by the Government. 
Government ownership is often intended to safeguard social and political goals, and 
individual companies have become publically owned as a consequence of intertemporal and 
situational considerations. When the extraction of oil and gas started in the 1970’s, the desire 
for control in relation to these natural resources was the rationale behind the public 
ownership in Statoil, and later Norsk Hydro. During the banking crisis in the 1990’s the 
government’s takeover of shares in several banks was necessary in order to prevent the 
bankruptcy of critical financial institutions (Meld. St. 13 (2010-2011)). 
The different reasons for government ownership are categorized and presented in the 
Government Ownership Policy (2012). As government ownership has become more 
professional, several public agencies have been privatized. Examples are the transformation 
of Televerket into Telenor in 1994 and the establishment of Cermaq, based on the 
government’s grain business in 1995.  
Today, public ownership is widespread and includes ownership in 10 companies listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. As of 31
st
 of October 2013, the ownership share on The Oslo 
Stock Exchange owned by the government and municipalities was 34.9 percent, equivalent 
to NOK 655 billion. This ownership is illustrated in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Government Ownership in Companies Listed on Oslo Stock Exchange 
 
Note: Ownership by the Norwegian Government in companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. *The ownership in Aker Solutions and 
Kværner is organized through Aker Kværner Holdings AS, where the government has an ownership share of 30.0%. Aker Kværner 
Holdings owns approximately 40% of Aker Solutions and Kværner, and is co-owned with Aker ASA. 
1.2 Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Due to its coastline, fishing has always been of great importance to Norway. After oil and 
gas, it is today the second largest export industry. The industry has connected Norway with 
foreign markets and contributed to economic development. 
The industry has proven to be very adaptable, incorporating technological development and 
seizing opportunities related to fish farming. Since the introduction during the 1970`s, fish 
farming now accounts for more than half of Norwegian exports of fish. Norway is today a 
modern fishing and aquaculture nation, with an advanced fleet of vessels and state-of-the-art 
infrastructure along the coast, with fish farms, gutting and processing facilities. Norway has 
expert knowledge relating to the farming of North-Atlantic salmon and feed production, and 
is world leading in research on diseases affecting fisheries. These factors have given Norway 
a unique position within aquaculture internationally (Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal 
Affairs, 2013). 
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1.3 Examples of Government Ownership in Norway 
Among the most relevant public ownership strategies is the well-known Hydro model. That 
implies taking on the role as a passive owner, meaning that the operations are unaffected and 
the government provides financial stability. This has proven to be a solution that is 
welcomed by the capital markets, the government is seen as a professional investor and 
reliable business partner. The Hydro model shows how government ownership might be 
conducted, if the focus is to give management a high level of strategic and operational 
freedom. 
In other companies, ownership has been more debated. The Norwegian Government’s 
ownership in SAS serves as an example of how public ownership may influence financial 
performance negatively. SAS has for several years operated with sizable deficits, and relied 
on the governments of the three Scandinavian countries for financial support, in order to 
survive. Here the public ownership may have delayed the company’s willingness to tackle its 
financial difficulties. 
Other motives for government ownership are for example determined by goals related to 
sector political concerns and national anchoring. The government’s ownership in DNB is 
important in order to secure domestic funding for Norwegian companies and maintain a 
sustainable financial climate. This is an example of how government ownership might be 
justified through positive externalities and cluster effects. 
1.4 Main Objective 
Ownership within the aquaculture industry is differentiated, comprising of owners with 
different identities. The government currently owns 56.7 percent of Cermaq, which equals 
7.8 percent of the entire Seafood Index (OSLSFX). In addition to direct ownership, the 
industry is strictly regulated, with the distribution of licenses
1
 being the most important tool. 
This raises an interesting question: If the government through regulation can control the 
                                                 
1
 The government has since 1973 been distributing licenses to companies within the aquaculture industry. 
Through this process it controls the industry both in terms of which companies that are part of it, and in what 
regions fish farming is carried out. 
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industry and induce sustainable development, how does one justify the need for direct 
ownership? 
Assuming efficient capital markets, the reaction will be reflected in the share price and can 
be quantified by comparing Tobin’s Q for Cermaq to that of its competitors. With the 
government taking on multiple roles, we would also look into the actual impact on the 
company’s results. We therefore study the return on assets. The reason for using these two 
measures will be discussed later. 
 We consequently raise the following research question: 
Does government ownership have any significant effect on Cermaq’s financial 
performance, measured as (i) Tobin’s Q and (ii) return on assets? 
1.5 Peer Group 
Building a peer group consisting of comparable companies within the same industry and 
with the same characteristics will improve the accuracy and credibility of our results. Oslo 
Stock Exchange is the world’s largest and most important financial market place for the 
seafood industry and the Oslo Seafood Index (OSLSFX) has served as a natural starting 
point. The Seafood Index consists as of 01.11.2013 of 14 companies: AKVA, AUSS, 
BAKKA, CEQ, DOM, GSF, HBC, HFISK, LSG MHG, NRS, SALM, SSC and STRANS. 
Most of these companies are engaged in fish farming, fish feed and processing.  
Out of the 13 companies (besides Cermaq) being listed on OSLSFX, we have chosen to 
include 9 companies in our peer group. This selection is based on several characteristics such 
as type of business, size, legislation, business environment etc. We have also chosen to 
include Copeinca (COP), a Peruvian producer of fishmeal and fish oil also listed on OSE. 
We have eliminated Hofseth Biocare (HBC) and Sølvtrans (STRANS), these companies are 
listed on Oslo Axess and are engaged in a type of business which is not comparable to 
Cermaq. This is also the case with Domstein (DOM) and AKVA Group (AKVA), which are 
involved in the production of raw-materials to the seafood industry and technology for fish 
farming, respectively. A description of each company is provided in Appendix 2. 
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1.6 Scope and limitations 
In this paper, we will direct our attention towards government ownership. This implies that 
we will not discuss all aspects of other ownership identities. Discussion of other explanatory 
variables will mostly be linked to whether there are observable differences between 
government and non-government owners, and the potential impact of these differences. 
There are numerous measures of financial performance, we will only focus on two of them, 
Tobin’s Q and the return on assets. A more holistic approach would have been to analyze 
government ownership from a social economic point of view, but we will ignore the broader 
stakeholder perspective and focus solely on shareholder value. We regard this as a 
reasonable limitation since the effects of externalities are difficult to quantify.  
Focusing on one single industry will limit the number of observations and also the external 
validity of our results. This will, on the other hand, allow us to get a better understanding of 
the impact of government ownership in this particular sector. Focusing solely on the 
aquaculture industry means however that we will only be able to observe one company with 
government ownership, and we consequently look at the companies from the very first 
quarter Cermaq was listed, the period from Q4 2005 until Q4 2012.  
Building a peer group consisting of comparable companies within the same industry and 
with the same characteristics is crucial for our results and their credibility. With Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE) being the world’s largest and most important financial market place for the 
seafood industry, it serves as a natural starting point. We have used companies on the Oslo 
Seafood Index (OSLSFX) as a basis, and made individual adjustments based on their fit. The 
result is a peer group, which we believe will serve as a good benchmark for Cermaq. 
In order to study the relationship empirically we have chosen a commonly used empirical 
method. In our case, this is the Random Effects model, since this is the most efficient 
method, utilizing the highest amount of variation. We have chosen to ignore more complex 
econometric methods of simultaneous equations as these, due to a limited number of 
observations, could produce unreliable results.  
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1.7 Structure 
In section 2 we provide a theoretical framework on corporate governance mechanisms, 
emphasizing the different ownership identities.  We will also briefly present previous studies 
to give the reader a sense of where the research on government ownership currently stands. 
In section 3 we will present the Norwegian Government’s ownership policy, and explain 
how this is conducted. Moving on to our analysis in section 4, where we offer a thorough 
description on how we came to our conclusions. Section 5 will elaborate further, and at the 
very end of the study we will conclude upon our findings. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
We will begin this chapter with an explanation of corporate governance, before we turn our 
attention towards agency theory. Furthermore we will present the reader with different 
theories and empirical studies concerning several ownership-characteristics such as identity, 
concentration etc. We also discuss different corporate governance mechanisms, and how 
these affect the performance of the firm.  
2.1 Corporate Governance 
We often see that owners separate themselves from their invested capital, and delegate the 
decision-making authority to others having the necessary skill and experience.  A set of rules 
is determined so that management will not take advantage of the authority given them. This 
is referred to as alignment of incentives and it is common to look at a company as a set of 
oral and written contracts (Coase, 1937). Traditional corporate governance is a set of 
principles assisting investors to protect their invested capital and influence, in a context 
where perfect contracts do not exist. 
We use the definition provided by Eckbo (2006); “a company’s corporate governance system 
is defined as the sum of constraints that the company’s internal organization, external capital 
markets and legal framework place on the opportunity for insiders to expropriate values from 
minority shareholders”.  
2.2 Principal-Agent Theory 
Berle and Means, (1932) were among the first who addressed the problems with separating 
ownership and control. These ideas where further developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
who described the agency relationship as a contract under which one person engages another 
person to perform some services on their behalf, which involves delegating decision-making 
authority. If the principal and the agent have different agendas, then the agent will not 
always act in the principal’s best interest. Agency theory is closely linked to the concept of 
moral hazard, meaning that the principal knows very little about how, and with what effort 
the agent acts (Dembe and Boden, 2000). 
 14 
The agent will typically be the management responsible for running the company on a daily 
basis. Consequently, the principal will be the owners, having provided the necessary capital. 
The principal will be concerned with maximizing return while the agent may have other 
goals. There are three key reasons why contracts can be problematic: (i) information 
asymmetry, (ii) conflicts of interest and (iii) risk aversion. In the case of information 
asymmetry, the basic problem is that the management possesses more company-specific 
information than the owner. A conflict of interest might be a disagreement on what the 
overall goal of the company is, or how this goal should be reached. Finally, management can 
be more concerned with delivering consistently good results and may therefore be reluctant 
to take on risky projects, even if it is expected to create additional value (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
The value loss resulting from separating ownership and control is referred to as agency costs. 
We can distinguish between monitoring costs incurred by the principal when monitoring the 
agent, bonding (reporting) costs incurred by the agent demonstrating that he or she is in fact 
acting in the principal’s best interest, and residual loss which is the wealth or welfare loss 
incurred by the principal if the agent’s decisions and activities do not coincide with the 
decisions or activities that maximize the principals utility. Corporate governance is a set of 
mechanisms aiming at reducing agency costs. 
The free cash flow problem is a direct consequence of the potential conflict of interests 
between the management and owners. Management will want more freedom and has 
incentives to keep most of the capital in the company, despite lacking positive net present 
value (NPV) investments. A growing business offer higher status and income for the 
management, at the same time as expansion is both exciting and challenging. The 
management may however prioritize personal interests, and could be tempted to increase 
corporate spending, representing unnecessary and unwanted costs for the owners. Ideally this 
cash flow should rather have been distributed to the shareholders.  
2.3 Owner Identity 
Owner identity determines the preferences and goals of owners, and therefore their 
incentives and methods to monitor and influence. Different types of owners differ in terms of 
wealth, costs of capital, competence, preferences for perks and non-ownership ties  
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). In the classification of different owners, we apply five 
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different labels: individual, financial, non-financial, international and government. This is 
based on the framework provided by the Central Securities Depository (Oslo VPS, 2013). 
Agency theory predicts that direct ownership, in terms of performance, is better than indirect 
ownership, as it minimizes the distance between owner and management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This implies that there are differences with regards to both incentives and 
the ability to create value. Empirical evidence from Norway and the US support the 
assumption that direct ownership has a better effect on profitability than indirect ownership 
(Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2005). It is therefore surprising that the share of individual private 
owners on Oslo Stock Exchange is among the lowest in Europe, and decreasing.  
2.3.1 Individual Ownership 
Individual owners represent a personal claim on the firm’s cash flow. In theory this direct 
monitoring should have a positive effect on performance as the principal has incentives to 
monitor the agent closely. On the other hand, a personal owner holding a relatively small 
stake in the company will have little influence and therefore fewer incentives to monitor. 
A family owned company is a special case in the sense that families typically play the role of 
both owner and manager. Because families do not act through agents, the incentive 
alignment theory suggests a positive effect. Family loyalty can overcome problems related to 
incentives and improve efficiency (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Personal owners and 
families are classified as direct owners, and therefore per definition active. The fact that this 
type of ownership has indeed survived in competition with other types of ownerships can be 
seen as evidence that this specific ownership-style may be optimal in some situations. 
There is no empirical evidence suggesting that family owned companies underperform 
compared to similar companies with different ownership (Denis and Denis, 1994). Measured 
as Tobin’s Q, family owned companies seem to outperform non-family owned companies, 
however when measured on return on assets, the majority of studies find no significant 
difference (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2005).  
2.3.2 Financial Ownership 
Financial owners are often referred to as institutional investors, with hedge funds, private 
equity funds and pension funds being examples. An institutional investor is an indirect 
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owner acting as an agent on behalf of other investors. With indirect ownership it is the direct 
agent (the institution) that monitors, without interference from the direct principal (the 
providers of capital) (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001a). This will, according to the strategic-
alignment hypothesis imply a negative effect on performance, as these institutions will 
monitor with lower quality because of insufficient value-maximizing incentives. On the 
other hand, the efficient-monitoring hypothesis predicts that financial institutions are more 
competent than other investors, and that they can monitor with higher quality at a lower cost 
(Pound, 1988). 
Although empirical evidence is not decisive, in the US there has been proven a strong 
positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and the amount of shares held by institutional 
investor, consistent with the efficient-monitoring hypothesis (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990).  Research following the privatization of Eastern Europe found that banks (as owners), 
despite potential conflicts of interests, have a positive effect on corporate governance 
because of their monitoring ability. 
2.3.3 Non-Financial Ownership 
Non-financial ownership occurs when other companies (limited companies, operational 
firms and non-profit organizations) have long-term equity positions in other firms. 
Ownership in other companies may represent strategic advantages, for example lower 
contracting costs in product markets. It may also provide useful information regarding 
investment opportunities in target firms. Non-financial ownership could be seen as a form of 
diversification, as a company can adjust its exposure to certain markets and risk factors by 
investing in other companies. On the other side, relationship-specific assets can create hold 
up costs between different companies. According to agency theory, the quality of the 
monitoring would be lower, since a non-financial owner is an institution relying on agents.  
2.3.4 International Ownership 
According to agency theory, international investors perform less active corporate governance 
since they lack specific knowledge on the particular local business environment (Bøhren and 
Ødegaard, 2001b). As a direct consequence, monitoring costs for foreign investors can be 
considerably higher than for local investors. If international owners hold shares in 
Norwegian listed firms, they would therefore most likely be passive owners, not contributing 
to corporate governance. On the positive side however, foreign owners may have a positive 
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influence through spillover effects. Potential spillovers are for example capital, technology, 
human capital and best practice from other countries (Hill, 2003). International owners have 
no emotional ties to the country they are investing in, as they are disconnected from local 
society and environment, and are consequently in a position where they can make solely 
value-maximizing decisions. This may represent a challenge for politicians concerned with 
job losses if production and/or headquarter functions are moved abroad.  
When an international investor regards the investment as solely financial, this will often also 
relate to the fact that he or she wishes to diversify the portfolio. The fact that foreign 
investors have become more anonymous and are over-represented in B-shares, suggests that 
diversification is the primary motive. Although international investors have traditionally 
been the largest ownership-type, these are often invested through nominee
2
 accounts, making 
it difficult to quantify the extent of foreign ownership. Studies from other countries indicate 
however a positive relationship between international owners and performance, but there are 
issues related to the causality of these findings. It has been indicated that it is the size and 
economic strength of these companies that impose a positive effect on performance, rather 
than the fact that the owner is foreign (Douma, George and Kabir, 2006). 
2.3.5 Government Ownership 
There are two key arguments for government ownership: market failure and unfair 
distribution. In the case of market failure, theory suggests that the government should 
intervene and thereby ensure an effective use of resources. But even if the market is 
efficient, the resulting allocation may still not be justified in political terms. The government 
may then take action through market regulation or direct ownership.  
One of the most important arguments raised in favor of government ownership is that it 
gives better control with decision making, than what can be achieved through regulation. 
Regulation is both costly and demanding, favoring direct government ownership. In cases of 
natural monopolies it is challenging to develop a regulatory framework that prevents that the 
monopolist is left with a large surplus (Pedersen, 1995).  
                                                 
2
 A nominee account is a type of account in which a stockbroker holds shares belonging to clients, making 
buying and selling securities easier.  
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A major concern with public ownership is the fact that the government can mix its roles as 
owner, monitoring authority and regulator (Bøhren, 2005; Shirley and Walsh, 2003). This 
may prove problematic, as the government on one side shall determine the regulatory 
framework and on the other side shall run a company based on market principles. Public 
companies are typically inefficient, and their losses result in relatively large costs for the 
society (Boyko, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1996). This has naturally become the center of 
attention in the debate concerning government ownership. The majority of studies indicate 
that public companies are less efficient than corresponding private companies. An 
international study by Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) found that the 
efficiency of public institution was increased following privatization. Another argument, 
opposing government ownership, can be the lack of competition, which in itself is a 
disciplining mechanism.  
By partly privatizing a company, it will be exposed to market forces, leading to a more 
market-oriented, adaptable, dynamic operation and flexible organization of the company. 
But the government may resemble a large corporate owner since they are both represented 
by agents. Agency theory suggests that misalignment of incentives will imply negative 
effects on performance, and both wholly owned and partly privatized companies are 
therefore expected to perform worse than private companies. Private companies do generally 
perform better than public companies, while partly privatized companies do interestingly not 
perform better than public companies. On the contrary, these companies often perform worse 
than wholly owned public companies, which may be explained by the conflict of interest 
between the private and public owners. A study of 25 international airline companies 
revealed that partly privatization has resulted in few productivity effects in the short run 
(Ehrlich, Gallais-Hasmonno, Liu, and Lutter, 1994). 
The fact that the government through its ownership can extract benefits, can be seen as a sort 
of majority-minority problem. Since the government obviously often is concerned with other 
considerations in addition to profit maximization, the matter is especially sensitive since 
various interest groups may influence the politicians and gain support for their cause through 
lobbying. Since the motivation behind government ownership is generally not only financial, 
a complete analysis should therefore include a larger stakeholder perspective.  
The Norwegian Government has yet to provide sufficient economic reasons for using public 
funds to prevent influence by foreign owners (Bøhren, 2005). 
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2.4 Ownership Concentration 
Concentration of ownership will affect the owner's influence and the incentives to monitor. 
Large shareholders have increased power and can often ensure that management acts 
according to their interests (Schleifer and Vishny, 1986). Minority shareholders are likely to 
free ride, as only an owner with a sufficiently large equity stake will have economic 
incentives to carry monitoring costs (Schleifer and Vishny, 1996). When ownership is 
separated from control, and the ownership concentration is dispersed, this may have an 
adverse effect on firm value. 
Large owners may benefit at the expense of minority shareholders in several ways, increased 
ownership concentration may therefore imply greater entrenchment, resulting in a lower 
market capitalization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1988). 
Further on, financial performance may suffer as large owners may become risk averse and 
focus on low risk due to the fact that they might have invested an irrationally large amount 
of their wealth in a single company and lack diversification. Minority-protection is regulated 
through legislation and company-specific statutes. 
2.5 Insider Ownership 
According to agency theory one of the major problems with separating ownership and 
control, is the misalignment of incentives. If we observe a high degree of insider ownership, 
this means that the management has the same kind of exposure as the owners. In theory, 
increased insider ownership therefore reduces the need for outside monitoring, as the 
management and owners now have aligned incentives. This implies that there is a positive 
relationship between insider holdings and firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
However, there is still a possibility that insider-owners have a different agenda than outside 
owners, and powerful insiders may expropriate wealth from outsiders. Most importantly 
however is perhaps the fact that a manager, which is heavily invested in his or her own 
company, is prone to make risk adverse investment decisions. This will impact the 
performance negatively. Managers may also make value-reducing decisions, if that is needed 
to safeguard their current position (Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1988). 
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2.6 Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
2.6.1 Market Competition 
The market in itself provides various corporate governance mechanisms, as competition 
within different markets discipline management and reduce agency costs. When product, 
labor and takeover markets are fully competitive, a self-serving manager will find it optimal 
to maximize shareholder value. 
A highly competitive output market will have positive effects on corporate governance and 
may reduce agency costs as the management has fewer opportunities for wasting corporate 
resources (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001b). If management does not realize the company’s 
potential by maximizing profitability and share value, the company may lose its 
competitiveness (Grossman and Hart, 1988).  
The market for corporate talent may also function as a corporate governance mechanism. 
The reputation of a corporate manager will likely determine whether he or she will receive 
attractive offers in the future (Bøhren and, 2001a). With a well-functioning labor market for 
qualified leaders, the current management will be incentivized to run the company in a way 
that benefits the shareholders.  
A well-functioning market for corporate control will in theory serve as a governance 
mechanism, as managers that are not performing optimally will be replaced (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1985; Stultz, 1988). If there is a takeover, the acquirer must have 
identified possible improvements, probably related to the fact that the current management 
was underperforming. This threat will have a disciplining effect on management, which will 
perform the best they can to avoid this kind of situation. Research indicates that the market 
for corporate control serves both shareholders and the society as a whole (Jensen, 1988). 
2.6.2 Financial Policy 
A company with a high debt ratio, generous dividend policy, extensive program for 
repurchasing of own shares or preference for raising capital through offerings, will likely 
display better corporate governance than companies without such policies. By financing the 
company with debt instead of equity, or committing to a generous dividend policy, the 
company will restrict the available free cash flow and thereby reduce the agency costs 
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related to the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). In order to carry out new investments, 
the company must rely on capital markets, meaning that it will be on a shorter leash, and 
under constant scrutiny. According to agency theory, both debt financing and dividend 
payments are value-creating corporate governance mechanisms. 
In the choice between dividends and debt, the latter is a firmer claim, forcing management to 
pay out a given amount of cash. Since the purpose is to motivate management to pay out the 
free cash flow, there are benefits to debt in making the company more focused on 
profitability (absolute payables) and reducing agency costs (Jensen, 1986). If new borrowing 
is solely a disciplining mechanism, money raised from the debt issue is usually paid out as 
extraordinary dividends.  
Paying dividends reduces excess equity in the company and will have similar effects as debt 
on agency costs. Although it is not as firm a claim as debt, dividend is no soft claim.  Lintner 
(1956) pointed out that dividend changes are infrequent, and that dividend payments in that 
sense are sticky. Companies that have communicated a certain dividend payments will have 
strong incentives to follow this path, since any less than promised payment will be 
interpreted as a negative sign by the capital markets, impacting the market capitalization of 
the company. Furthermore, payment of dividends can be a signal that the majority will not 
exploit the minority, because dividend payments benefit all shareholders. Dividend payments 
will not be optimal if the company is able to reinvest its retained earnings and receive a 
return higher than the shareholders cost of capital. 
2.6.3 Legal Framework 
Shareholder protection is linked to how easily the majority may exploit their position of 
power, and is meant to make sure that owners get back their investment through a fair share 
price. Sufficient protection reduces the possibility of majority owners and management 
exploiting the company’s resources at the expense of other stakeholders.  
Empirical findings support the fact that countries practicing common law have a higher 
degree of shareholder protection than countries practicing civil law (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1999). The Norwegian legal tradition is based on civil law. If 
shareholder protection is poor, investors may protect themselves by increasing their 
ownership, and in that sense legal protection and high ownership concentration can be 
regarded as substitutes. Differences in regulation and legal framework may to some extent 
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explain the observable differences in ownership structure between different countries (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 2000). Control by large owners can make up 
for a lacking shareholder protection and undeveloped capital markets, and may consequently 
have positive effects.  
Costs associated with control and monitoring can be related to complexity in the company 
structure and geographically dispersed operations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Control and 
monitoring through revision, formal control systems, budget restrictions, incentive- and 
reward programs, and interaction with management are necessities if the company is to be 
managed as efficiently as possible. Adequate control mechanisms are especially important in 
the process of raising capital since no rational investor will invest capital in a complex 
company dominated by individuals having unfounded power.  
The General Meeting is the company’s legislative body, deciding the framework for how the 
company should be operated. The voting system at these general meetings will also affect 
the quality of the company’s corporate governance.  
2.6.4 Market Efficiency 
Stock prices follow a random walk, possibly with a drift, implying that price changes should 
be random and unpredictable and that changes, depending on the efficiency, will be caused 
by new and unpredictable information (Fama, 1965). Consequently, we would expect sudden 
changes in ownership structure to have an immediate effect on share prices. Looking at the 
relationship between market- and book values (Tobin’s Q) one could have included a 
discussion regarding different degrees of market efficiency. However, as we believe that this 
would be outside the scope of this paper it has deliberately been left out, and we regard the 
market capitalization of the company as its fair value.  
High quality information makes it possible for owners and stakeholders to more easily 
monitor and control the company’s progress and performance. The different participants 
make the capital market an important analyst, interpreter and distributor of information, and 
any disappointment or sign of bad performance will be reflected in the share price. Reporting 
through annual and quarterly reports is the company’s most important way of 
communicating what they have achieved over the period. However, the credibility of this 
information will rely on the current accounting standards and practices, making revision an 
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important control mechanism. Investors with a global investment strategy face increasing 
challenges, as capital markets are characterized by continued deregulation and integration.  
2.6.5 Incentive Contracts 
Incentive contracts can reduce agency costs, as it is a way of aligning the manager’s 
monetary interests with the shareholders wish for return on their investment. We usually 
distinguish between compensation based on accounting measures and compensation based 
on share performance. The former will pay a cash-bonus, while the latter provides 
management with an upside potential through shares or options. 
Accounting based measures are not perfectly suitable as the managements current effort will 
materialize in the future, and not in the previous periods results (Lambert and Larcker, 
1987). Accounting-based measures may also become subject of measurement errors. 
Criticism of option-based compensation usually relates to the fact that management may act 
opportunistic on behalf of the company, as higher volatility equals a higher option value. 
This is referred to as asset substitution. Measures of share performance are sensitive to noise 
in demand and supply, and the correlation between effectiveness and share performance is 
reduced as the market capitalization of the company increases. Thus the option scheme can 
have a positive incentive effect, but may also have a negative effect through risk taking. 
Incentive based compensation is therefore counterproductive if the current management is 
not willing, or simply not able to add more value than it already does (Kim and Suh, 1993).  
2.7 Previous Research 
We have already mentioned several empirical findings, but to get a sense of where research 
currently stands, we present important studies related to government ownership. We will in 
addition, mention some empirical research on family owned firms since this will be 
applicable to several companies within the aquaculture industry.  
2.7.1 Evidence on Government Ownership  
Ødegaard (2009) investigates, in a report ordered by The Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
whether publically owned firms are traded with a discount on the Oslo Stock Exchange. This 
paper is an extensive research report, looking at the effects on both market and accounting 
based performance measures, over the period of 1989-2007. Ødegaard finds indications of 
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such a discount early on in the period, but this effect is no longer significant after 1997. 
However, there are still some indications that firms with government ownership have lower 
liquidity
3
 in the period 1998-2007, since the number of free-floating shares is limited. 
Effects on volatility are not unambiguous. According to his findings, government ownership 
is associated with negative performance because of conflicting interests between the capital 
markets and the government, and a liquidity discount as a result of the government’s large 
ownership share. During recent years, the government has become a more professional 
investor, thus the negative effects have more or less been cancelled out. 
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) conduct a comprehensive corporate governance study where 
they look at the impact of ownership structure and identity of the largest owner in Norway 
and 11 other European countries, using data from 435 of the largest firms. They find that 
government ownership is associated with a discount when looking at market-to-book values, 
and highlight the same reason as Ødegaard. The results indicate differences between 
countries, making it difficult to conclude. The overall findings however, is that government 
ownership impacts the market-to-book ratio negatively, thereby having a negative effect on 
performance. 
A study conducted by Boardman and Vining (1989) reveals that companies with mixed 
ownership do not perform better, than publically or privately owned companies. These 
companies even show a tendency of underperforming publically- and privately owned 
companies, which according to this paper is a consequence of the conflict of interests. 
2.7.2 Evidence from the Banking Sector 
There are a limited number of studies investigating the general effects of government 
ownership. However, government ownership within the banking sector has been subject to 
several studies, and we find it useful to include some of these in order to broaden our 
understanding. Barth, Caprio, and Vining (2001) study ownership structure and regulation 
within the banking sector, in relation to financial development in more than sixty countries. 
They find that a large degree of government control is associated with less financial 
development. But, reverse causality is an issue especially related to the banking sector 
because intervention is common when the financial system is vulnerable, and the 
                                                 
3
 Measured as the bid-ask spread, a commonly used to measure of stock liquidity. 
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government must take over banks in order to maintain financial stability
4
. Hence, 
government ownership will appear to have a negative effect on performance, while the 
causality link actually is the other way around. 
Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux, (2001) study the German banking sector, but do not find 
evidence that publicly owned banks underperform relative to privately owned banks, when 
investigating cost and profit inefficiencies. Verbrugge, Megginson, and Owens (1999) find 
that there is limited improvement in profitability (measured as return on assets) caused by 
privatization. 
2.7.3 Evidence on Privatization  
Studying performance before and after privatization is perhaps the best indication of 
differences between public and private ownership, since it will provide comparable results. 
Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh, (1994) investigate the effects of privatization by 
comparing the financial and operating performance pre and post privatization. The study 
includes 61 companies from different countries and industries, over the period of 1961-1990. 
This shows that performance is significantly better post privatization when measured in 
terms of profitability, real sales and productivity. The reason is mainly that the company that 
is privatized most likely will experience an increase in operating efficiency
5
. Shirley and 
Walsh (2003) summarize the results of numerous studies and find that 61.5 percent 
concluded that private or privatized companies perform better than their publically owned 
counterparts. Only 9.6 percent of the studies conclude that government ownership performs 
better. 
2.7.4  Evidence on Individual Owners 
Maury (2006) finds a positive relationship between family ownership and financial 
performance in corporations based in Western Europe. The results suggest that family owned 
companies have a 7.0 percent higher firm valuation than companies with non-family 
ownership. Jaskiewicz and Klein (2005) summarize 50 empirical studies on family 
                                                 
4
 A stable financial system, relatively immune to cyclicality, is important in order to distribute capital, execute 
payments and redistribute risk effectively. This became evident in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis in 2008, 
when liquidity in the inter-bank market completely froze. 
5
Eckel, Eckel, & Singhal (1997) studied the privatization of British Airways (BA) in 1987 and found that the 
stock price of U.S. competitors, in direct competition with BA, on average fell by 7.0 percent. This implied that 
the capital markets anticipated a much more competitive company, following the privatization. 
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ownership and find that 46.0 percent of family companies outperforms non-family 
companies. Only 8.0 percent of the studies indicate that family owned companies 
underperform. The remaining studies do not show any significant differences, or they link 
performance to situational factors such as regulations or competition. Looking at return on 
assets, the majority of the studies do not reveal any significant difference. 
2.7.5 Summary of Previous Research 
It is hard to prove a strong negative relationship between government ownership and 
financial performance. Two of the most relevant studies on government ownership in 
Norway, Ødegaard (2009) and Pedersen and Thomsen (2003), indicate a neutral or slightly 
negative effect. Other studies indicate the same effects, but these are, for a number of 
reasons, not directly comparable with regards to the effects of government ownership in 
Cermaq. In terms of concentration, government ownership may resemble family ownership, 
and there are studies indicating that these companies overperform relative to publically 
owned companies. That being said, government ownership has certain attributes that 
separate it from other ownership identities, and one should also look into what goals the 
government states for its ownership, besides maximizing profit. 
2.8 Our Contribution to Existing Research 
As we have seen, previous reports study the effects of government ownership by focusing on 
either a cross section of the economy or socially critical pillars such as the banking sector. 
This provides little insight on how government ownership is actually conducted when 
commercial goals are balanced with other political concerns. Through our paper, we wish to 
provide a deeper understanding of how government ownership is conducted in an industry 
that historically has been of great importance to the Norwegian economy. Norway has as 
previously stated a high degree of government ownership, and we will look more closely at 
how the government succeeds in running a previously wholly owned company with 
commercial objectives. 
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3. The Government’s Ownership Policy 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the Norwegian Governments attitude towards direct 
ownership. We will start off with introducing the different motives for government 
ownership and the type of classification that is currently being used. We will then address 
the different expectations and how the ownership is carried out. Finally, we will look at the 
government’s motivation for investing in Cermaq. 
3.1 Purposes of Government Ownership 
The government wants to contribute to economic development in Norway through active 
ownership. In the Government Ownership Policy
6
 the government has, besides long-term 
value creation, stated five main arguments for direct ownership. 
National anchoring:  
The government wants to facilitate an innovative, knowledge based and sustainable economy 
that is retained and further developed in Norway. By holding an ownership share of more 
than one third and establishing a controlling minority, the government can retain companies 
representing key competence in the country.  
Control with natural resources:  
In order to secure jurisdiction and revenues from natural resources, the government is of the 
perception that direct public ownership is vital. This is especially the case with energy 
companies where direct ownership is more efficient than the tax system. Ownership will 
provide good control with how the business is conducted, and its strategic direction. 
Sector-political considerations:  
The government believes that some tasks are of such importance that they should not be 
controlled by commercial interests. This includes the health sector, and parts of the transport 
and communication sector and other critical infrastructure.  
                                                 
6
 The Government Ownership Policy was published in June 2012 by the Stoltenberg II Government. 
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Correcting market failure:  
The government considers that certain goods and services are best produced in markets not 
characterized by perfect competition, such as public goods and products produced in natural 
monopolies. Consequently, separate and controlled markets have been established for some 
products and services. 
Long-term ownership:  
Being a financially strong long-term owner, the government aim to ensure stability in 
ownership and induce industrial development. Although being interested in short-term 
profitability, the government believes that its ownership will encourage a long-term healthy 
and beneficial development. 
3.2 Classification of Investments 
Ownership may have several purposes, and based on the motivation each publically owned 
company is placed into one out of four different categories:  
Category 1: Commercial investments 
For these companies the goals are profitability, value creation and maximizing return. 
Changes in the government’s ownership will happen if it is likely to improve industrial and 
commercial development while also securing that the government’s values are protected. 
Category 2: Commercial investments with national anchoring 
The ownership is commercially motivated, but with the additional dimension that it secures a 
domestic anchoring of the company’s headquarters and related functions. This is secured 
through an ownership share of no less than one third.  
Category 3:Commercial investments with other specific objectives 
Ownership is characterized by goals other than commercial profitability. These goals are 
ensured through direct ownership in addition to ordinary regulatory instruments. 
Category 4: Investments with sector-political objectives 
For this last category ownership is mainly motivated by sector political goals. The 
government will as an owner focus on achieving specific goals, ideally with an accounting 
profit. 
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3.3 Expectations and Guidelines 
The government will have certain expectations on how companies, and especially publically 
owned companies, conduct their business.  All expectations have, unless otherwise noted, a 
time horizon of 3-5 years and are based upon a “follow or explain” principle7. In the 
following we will only focus on expectations for companies classified as commercial 
investments, such as Cermaq. 
Return 
The government has a long-term perspective, wishing to contribute to industrial growth, 
employment and development. It is, however, important that companies also achieve a long-
term return on invested capital. For listed companies, this return will typically be measured 
as the share performance, relative to market development and industry-indices. A target, or 
expected return, will be prepared for every company. Impacting the return, it is also 
desirable that the company maintains a reasonable capital structure. 
Figure 1: Share Performance vs. OSEBX and OSLSFX 
Note: Cermaq’s share performance versus Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) and Oslo Seafood Index (OSLSFX), rebased 
at 100 as of 01.06.2010. OSEBX is an investable index consisting of a representative sample of all shares listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, adjusted for free-floating shares and dividends. OSLSFX consists of 14 companies operating within the seafood sector. The 
index includes listings on Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess and is adjusted for company-specific events and dividends on a daily basis.  
                                                 
7
 It is expected that publically owned companies either: (i) follow the guidelines laid out by the government, or 
(ii) on their own initiative explain why they have deviated from these.   
 30 
Since the listing in October 2005, Cermaq’s stock price has increased 139 percent8. 
Measured against the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) Cermaq has over 
the last 12 months overperformed by 18.5 percent. However, compared to the Oslo Stock 
Exchange Seafood Index (OSLSFX) Cermaq has underperformed by 21.6 percent. The 
relative performance is shown in Figure 1, while a detailed overview is provided in 
Appendix 3. 
Dividend policy and repurchase of shares 
The government will support a dividend policy that promotes long-term value creation, and 
reflect what the government as an owner regards as an appropriate tradeoff between 
dividends and retained earnings. Long-term dividend expectations are formulated as a 
percentage of the accounting result after minority interests and should not cause competitive 
advantages or disadvantages compared to privately owned companies. The government also 
expresses its year-to-year expectations, which are communicated to the board prior to the 
general meeting. The government cannot dictate the company’s dividend policy but may 
freely, and with legitimacy, express its expectations and what assessments these are based 
upon. 
Repurchase of shares should be seen in connection with the company’s financial position. 
Through buying back shares and taking them out of circulation there will be no changes to 
underlying values of the remaining shares, and repurchase-programs are thus instruments for 
optimizing the company’s capital structure. The government regards repurchase programs as 
a supplement rather than an alternative to dividends. Whether the government wishes to 
participate will be evaluated in each single case, but the government typically prefers that the 
repurchase does not affect their ownership share. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Publically owned companies are expected to be leading in the work on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and to follow “best practice” regardless of where their business is 
conducted. In those cases where activities are regarded as harmful, regulation is preferred 
over direct ownership. Companies with international operations are expected to commit 
themselves to several international guidelines and conventions
9. It is the government’s 
                                                 
8
 Based on closing price October 24, 2005 (NOK 44.10) and closing price October 30, 2013 (NOK 105.50). 
9
 The UN Global Compact, OECD guidelines for international companies and ILO’s eight core conventions. 
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opinion that high expectations in the field of CSR will give high returns over time and that it 
is a value driver to act ethically correct. We will not revert to this topic, as we believe a 
discussion regarding the effects of CSR is outside the scope of this paper
10
. 
Research and development 
The government highly values focus on research and development, and expects publically 
owned companies to emphasize R&D activities. The corporate management is expected to 
actively work on research, innovation and development of competence in order to strengthen 
operations, and to deliberately communicate own research results and commercialize results 
from other research groups.  
Executive remuneration 
The government bases its executive remuneration policy on the Norwegian welfare model, 
valuing a sound social safety net, small wage differentials and collaboration between the 
different parties in the labor market. Publically owned companies are expected to show 
moderation in their compensation of executive management. The government published 
adjusted guidelines concerning executive remuneration in publically owned companies in 
April 2011.  
The main component should be the fixed salary and potential arrangements with variable 
salary must be transparent, time-limited and based on objective and measurable criteria. 
Unless special circumstances dictate otherwise, the total variable salary for any given year 
should not exceed 6 months fixed salary. The government opposes option-like agreements, 
but the use of share programs is permitted if regarded as especially suitable for realizing 
long-term goals. Pension terms should be in line with the terms of other employees in the 
company. In case of a termination, severance of up to 12 months’ salary may be agreed 
upon, given that the departure is not voluntary and that the manager has waived his rights 
stated in the Working Environment Act. 
The Board 
The government wishes to secure a well-composed and competent board in companies with 
public investments. The board shall collectively possess the desired competence, and the 
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 Large corporations such as for example Apple and BMW are known for their efforts regarding CSR, and 
have proven that this is perfectly compatible with solid financial performance. But one could discuss the 
causality, since the CSR focus itself likely won’t be the reason for high earnings. 
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chosen members should have broad and relevant experience. The government will 
emphasize differences in background in the composition of the board, and it believes that the 
legal requirement of one third of the board members being chosen among employees in the 
company has a positive influence. The government also supports a fair distribution between 
men and women and amended the legislation to reach this goal a few years ago. Members of 
parliament should not be elected as board members, and it is an unwritten rule that both 
councils and state secretaries resign similar positions prior to taking office. Furthermore, a 
CEO should never be appointed as a member of the board
11
.  
Diversity and gender equality 
The implementation of gender representation on the board level has, in the government’s 
opinion, been successful
12. Although paving the way, these regulations haven’t secured 
diversity on all levels of the company, and the government stated that it would work to 
increase the share of female chairmen and women in leading positions. The government 
believes that Norwegian companies should develop strategies for how women and minorities 
can be recruited to management positions.  
3.4 Organization of Ownership 
Most of the ownership has, encouraged by OECD, been moved to The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in an attempt to coordinate the commercial ownership. As part of the process of 
setting more ambitious goals for the exercise of ownership, the government strengthened 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry through the establishment of the Ownership Department. 
This is likely to increase expertise and resources in relation to the government ownership and 
strengthen cooperation. 
 
                                                 
11
 This problem is widespread in the US, where it is quite common that the CEO of the company also is the 
chairman of the board. Examples are Blackrock and JP Morgan Chase. In JP Morgan Chase there has been a 
growing discontent with CEO and Chairman Jamie Dimon’s mixed roles, and this was put to a vote twice 
during the last two years. The attempt of dividing the two roles was rejected, but still made some ripples in the 
water here in Norway, as NBIM as a shareholder in JP Morgan were criticized for not announcing what they 
had voted. This was seen as a violation of the Norwegian Government’s transparency-policy. 
12
 The law regarding gender representation for corporate boards was implemented in 2008, resulting in 
increased representation, from 6 to 43 percent (measured as of 2010).  
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3.5 The Ownership in Cermaq 
The ownership in Cermaq is justified in the Government Ownership Policy (2012) report:  
“The objective with the ownership in Cermaq is to contribute to the development of an 
important environment for fish farming, fish feed and fish feed related research, both in 
Norway and internationally. It is of great importance to the government that the company is 
a major player in the further development in the aquaculture industry in Norway. The 
company should be run on a commercial basis”. 
Cermaq ASA was during 2012 moved from Category 2 into a Category 1. At the time 
Cermaq was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, the government owned 43.5 percent of the 
company, with the possibility of reducing its ownership through a combination of dilution 
and direct divestments. This authorization was later limited, allowing dilution to an 
ownership share of no less than 34 percent. As a result of the attempted acquisition by 
Marine Harvest, the Norwegian parliament revised the mandate, allowing the government to 
increase its ownership in Cermaq, with an upper limit of 65 percent. As a result the 
government increased their ownership to 59,17 percent. This was justified with arguments 
claiming that increased ownership would provide room for actions in a situation where the 
company was at stake. A complete case study of the attempted acquisition is provided in 
Appendix 4. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
In this chapter we will explain our empirical approach. We start by presenting our dataset, its 
sources and what adjustments we have made. Then we will shift our focus towards the 
different explanatory variables and regression models. We present each single variable and 
describe the univariate relationship before diving into the technicalities. We want to use a 
model that utilizes the variation in our data in the best way possible and therefore chose the 
random effects model. Finally we will discuss possible weaknesses relating to our approach 
and the choice of model. A comprehensive analysis of our findings will be conducted later 
on, in chapter 5. 
4.1 Dataset 
The quality of our results will heavily depend on the quality of our dataset. For that reason it 
is important to be consistent in the way that we select and extract data. 
4.1.1 Descriptives  
Our dataset consists of both annual and quarterly data, for the period of 2005-2012. In order 
to include any given company for any given year, it is a prerequisite that all the necessary 
information is available. This means that a company will be included as of the period in 
which it was listed, at the earliest 2005 when Cermaq was listed. Data is gathered for a total 
of 10 companies, in addition to Cermaq. The peer group consists of Marine Harvest (MHG), 
Lerøy Seafood Group (LSG), Salmar (SALM), Norway Royal Salmon (NRS), Austevoll 
Seafood (AUSS), Bakkafrost (BAKKA), Grieg Seafood (GSF), Havfisk (HFISK), The 
Scottish Salmon Company (SSC) and Copeinca (COP). A more detailed explanation is 
provided in Appendix 2. Because several of the firms are not listed throughout the entire 
period we have what is called an unbalanced panel dataset (Wooldridge, 2006)  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Note: Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value and number of observations for all collected variables. Tobin’s Q (market 
value of equity and debt/total assets), ROA (net income/average total assets). Herfindahl (sum of squared ownership). Insider ownership 
(number of shares owned by members of management and the board as percentage of shares outstanding). Ownership of Top1, Top3 and 
Top5 largest shareholders. Ln mcap is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured in NOK million. State. Individual, 
International, Financial and Non-Financial is the identity of the largest shareholder. Numbers are based on a group of companies,  
consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. 
We see from Table 2 that the average Tobin’s Q is 1.2, while the minimum- and maximum 
values are 0.6 (COP) and 8.3 (SSC), respectively. Companies will on average have 1.5 
percent return on assets. The average amount of insider holdings is 18.4 percent, and the 
average ownership concentration measured by Herfindahl index is 0.25. The largest 
ownership share by one investor is observed in Lerøy and constitutes 75.0 percent as of Q4 
2008. Individual ownership is the most common ownership identity with 45.6 percent. 
    Figure 2: Average Tobin’s Q       Figure 3: Average Return on Assets  
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Note: Equally weighted average Tobin’s Q for peer group, 
based on data from Q1 2005 until Q2 2013. 
Note: Equally weighted average return on assets for peer 
group, based on data from Q1 2005 until Q2 2013. 
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Looking at Figure 2, Tobin’s Q is volatile and displays a highly cyclical pattern with peaks 
in first quarter 2006 and mid/year end 2010. Figure 3 tells us that the return on assets follows 
a similar cyclical path.  
4.1.2 Data Sources 
The majority of data is gathered from the annual and quarterly financial reports of the 
respective companies, and we have manually collected all accounting numbers as well as 
information on ownership concentration, insider ownership, largest shareholders and their 
identity. 
Share specific information such as share prices, shares outstanding, turnover rates etc, has 
mainly been gathered from Datastream
13
, using FactSet
14
 in those cases where information 
was not available. We have also utilized the information available through The Oslo Stock 
Exchange and NewsWeb. Our framework for classification of ownership identity is obtained 
from Oslo VPS, but the classification in itself is based on our personal evaluations.  
In order to get a sense on how government ownership is exercised and which guidelines that 
apply, we have read numerous parliamentary reports and different editions of the 
Government’s Ownership Policy.  
4.1.3 Adjustments 
Some of the necessary information, such as insider ownership and ownership concentration 
is only disclosed in the more detailed annual reports. In order to use quarterly data we have 
therefore made some assumptions.  Ownership in each company seems to be stable, both in 
terms of concentration and insider holdings. We believe it would be fair to assume a linear 
relationship between each annual observation, and find the quarterly data points by 
interpolating. Classification of ownership identity is crucial and if there during one year has 
been a change related to the largest shareholder, we have traced this transaction using 
NewsWeb, so that the classification at all times will be correct.  
                                                 
13
 Datastream is a database available for NHH students, and includes financial information (share prices, 
financial reports etc.) dating all the way back to 1980. 
14
 FactSet is a financial information and analytic software for investment professionals. 
 37 
When calculating the Herfindahl index
15
 the ideal approach would be to use all ownership 
shares. However, since we only have limited information, we base our calculations on the 20 
largest shareholders, and interpolate in order to get quarterly data points. Since ownership is 
concentrated, this assumption will increase the number of observations without inflicting 
validity. 
The majority of firms within our peer group have been listed later than 2005, and from an 
econometrical point of view this represents a problem, since these public listings should be 
randomly distributed in order to be included in our dataset. We know that public listings are 
cyclical and that this assumption is violated, but we see no other choice than to ignore this 
problem. It will likely not impact our results.   
After adjusting for missing information we are left with a total of 199 quarterly observations, 
which corresponds to an average of 18 observations per company. Previous corporate 
governance studies have included a larger data sample, studying several industries and 
countries. Since we are looking at one industry, and Cermaq was listed in 2005, this puts 
obvious constraints on the number of observations.  
4.2 Financial Performance Measures 
In order to measure financial performance we chose two different measures. While Tobin’s 
Q is a forward-looking valuation measure based on the observed relationship between 
market and book values, the return on assets is an accounting measure, focusing on the 
company’s past performance. The purpose is to highlight different aspects of profitability 
and to study performance from different angles, providing us with a better understanding.  
4.2.1 Tobin’s Q 
Previous research on corporate governance, such as for example Ødegaard (2009),  
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and 
Vishny (1999), has measured financial performance in terms of  Tobin’s Q. We use the 
definition provided by Tobin (1969):  
                                                 
15
Herfindahl index is the sum of squared ownership shares. Ødegaard (2009) finds an average of 0.15 (when 
firms are equally weighted) for Norwegian listed firms in the time period 1989-2007. 
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(Eq. 1) 
 
The numerator equals the combined market value of both equity and debt, but since the debt 
is not traded, we use the observed book value as a proxy. This is a fair assumption since the 
debt, even if traded, would have been valued close to the actual book value. The 
denominator is equal to the replacement cost of the company’s total assets, also using book 
values as a proxy. The economic interpretation of Tobin’s Q is fairly similar to that of the 
more familiar price-to-book ratio: A Q-ratio between 0 and 1 will imply that the replacement 
cost of the firm’s assets is greater than its market value, indicating that the stock is 
undervalued. A Q-ratio greater than 1 will mean the opposite, implying that the company is 
overvalued. 
The advantage with using Tobin’s Q is that it is a forward-looking measure taking 
expectations regarding future performance into account by looking at the market value of the 
company’s equity. Under the assumption that capital markets are perfectly efficient16, the 
market value will reflect the company’s intrinsic value, thereby absorbing the possible 
effects of ownership identity. 
4.2.2 Return on Assets 
We also chose to include an accounting-based
17
 performance measure, which can give us an 
objective and unbiased indication of how the company actually is performing. Return on 
asset is subject to cyclicality, but since we are looking at an entire industry this will have no 
implication for our results. When seen in the same context as Tobin’s Q, the return on assets 
will increase our understanding of the company’s performance. 
The calculation of this performance measure is seemingly straightforward, with the return on 
assets being defined as the net income (after tax and before distributions to minority owners) 
as a percentage of the representative level of total assets (usually regarded as the average of 
                                                 
16
 There are three different degrees of market efficiency, depending on how much information that is reflected 
in the share price. Different theories claim that financial markets either are weak, semi-strong or strong.  
17
 All companies in this paper report in accordance with the IFRS framework, eliminating problems related to 
different accounting practices and making financial statements comparable. 
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the opening and closing balance). Since we will need both the opening and closing balance 
of total assets, we encounter a problem when accounting figures are not available for the 
preceding year. In these cases the return on assets has been calculated on the basis of the 
closing balance.   
4.3 Explanatory Variables  
The selection of explanatory variables (Xit) is critical for our results, and is motivated by 
previous research in the fields of corporate governance. We have based our variables on 
Ødegaard’s (2009) study of government ownership on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and made 
some modification so that it better fits with our dataset. We use both internal and external 
explanatory variables.  
4.3.1 Insider Ownership 
We measure insider ownership as the number of shares held by members of management and 
the board of directors. A broader definition is usually preferred, but for simplistic purposes 
we have only included information available in the annual reports. The average insider 
ownership in our peer group (excluding CEQ) is 21.7 percent, which is high compared to the 
average of 0.2 percent in Cermaq. 
Besides looking at insider ownership we also include squared insider ownership as an 
explanatory variable, in order to adjust for non-linear effects. The larger part of previous 
research reveals that insider ownership has a curvilinear effect; first increasing value at low 
holdings, before the effect at higher levels can be decreasing, increasing or neutral (Morck, 
Schleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnel and Servas, 1990; Belkaoui and Pavlik, 1992; 
Holderness, Krozner and Sheenan, 1999).  
4.3.2 Ownership Concentration 
There are several ways to measure ownership concentration but we have chosen to use the 
Herfindahl index, which shows the accumulated squared ownership share of all shareholders. 
Looking at the Top1, Top3 and Top5 shareholders could also provide us with useful 
information, but it will not be necessary to include all variables as they provide roughly the 
same insight. The Herfindahl index is a better-suited measure when addressing ownership 
concentration because it utilizes information from a large sample of shareholders. 
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The average Herfindahl index for our peer group is 0.25, while it is 0.20 for Cermaq. 
Compared to 0.15, which Ødegaard (2009) found to be the average for all companies on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. This tells us that there is a high degree of ownership concentration 
within the aquaculture industry. 
4.3.3 Identification Variables 
In order to investigate the possible differences between ownership identities we must first 
develop a classification framework that lets us separate between different owners. We have 
chosen to use the five different ownership identities presented by Oslo VPS, meaning that 
the largest shareholder in each company at any given point in time is placed in one of the 
following categories: (i) State, (ii) Financial, (iii) Non-financial, (iv) Individual and (v) 
International. A complete overview is provided in Appendix 5. 
4.3.4 Market Capitalization 
We also include the firm’s market capitalization as an explanatory variable, as this is likely 
to affect performance in several ways. One could argue that this variable is related to how 
easy it is to acquire the company, thereby influencing the competition in the market for 
corporate control. It could also be that stellar performance is related to the fact that the 
company is of a certain size, and thereby can benefit from economies of scale. Market 
capitalization could also be thought of as a variable that controls for heterogeneity which the 
model otherwise cannot explain. 
When looking at the companies within our peer group it becomes evident that there are great 
variations, with market values spanning from NOK 558 million for Havfisk, to NOK 26 029 
million for Marine Harvest. The market capitalization is usually log-normally distributed and 
by using the natural logarithm our observations become more normally distributed, at the 
same time as adjusting for outliers. 
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4.4 Univariate Relationships 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Note: Correlation between profitability and explanatory variables. Tobin’s Q (market value of equity and debt/total assets), ROA (net 
income/average total assets). Herfindahl (sum of squared ownership). Insider ownership (number of shares owned by members of 
management and the board as percentage of shares outstanding). Ownership of Top1, Top3 and Top5 largest shareholders. Ln mcap is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured in NOK million. Numbers are based on a group of companies,  consisting of 
CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. 
Table 3 displays the correlation between the financial performance measures and various 
explanatory variables. Univariate relationships are important, as it will provide us with an 
understanding of the connection between two separate variables. However, it will not say 
anything about the effects. Because the identity variables are “dummies”, looking at 
correlation will provide no added value. 
Insider ownership is positively correlated with both Tobin’s Q and return on assets, although 
more for Tobin’s Q. Ownership concentration is negatively correlated with financial 
performance, with the relationship for all four variables being negative. Finally, we see that 
the market capitalization has a high degree of correlation with performance, but this is not 
surprising given that it together with debt constitutes the numerator in the Tobin’s Q 
fraction.   
4.5 Econometrical Issues 
Before moving on to our regression model, there are a couple of issues, which we must take 
into consideration. In order to get as reliable results as possible, we will in the following 
section discuss well-known econometrical issues, which could bias our results. 
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4.5.1 Heteroskedasticity  
One of the most common assumptions within the field of econometrics is that of constant 
variance in the error term (uit). If this is the case we have what is known as homoscedastic 
standard errors. The problem arises when standard errors are hetereroskedastic, as they 
cannot be used for hypothesis testing and estimation of confidence intervals, unless 
adjustments have been made. This will not bias our estimates, but it will bias the standard 
errors and the R-squared (positively). We test for heteroskedasticity by performing a 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, and reject the null hypothesis of constant variance 
based on a chi square value of 68.68. We account for heteroskedasticity by using robust 
standard errors. 
4.5.2 Multicollinearity 
Another potential problem is multicollinearity, meaning that our explanatory variables are 
highly correlated. According to Wooldridge (2006) multicollinearity will have the same 
effect as a small sample size, increasing standard errors of the explanatory variables, and 
potentially effect significance. There is nothing wrong with including variables that are 
correlated, given that the correlation between these independent variables is not too high. If 
this was the case our estimates would be unreliable (Verbeek, 2012).  
A case of multicollinearity would be if one explanatory variable is the exact linear 
combination of one or more other explanatory variables. Applicable to our problem, 
multicollinearity would be the result if including all ownership identity variables, known as 
the dummy variable trap (Verbeek, 2012). To eliminate the possibility of multicollinearity 
we will therefore always leave out at least one identity variable, and restrict the ownership 
concentration to the Herfindahl index. A correlation matrix, describing the relationship 
between all identified variables, is provided in Appendix 6. 
4.5.3 Autocorrelation 
A third issue that could bias our results is if our explanatory variables (Xit) are correlated 
over time, so-called autocorrelation. This is a common problem when studying time series, 
because one observation is likely to be dependent on previous observations. 
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                                           (Eq. 2)   
Similar to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation does not bias our estimates directly, but tend to 
underestimate standard errors. This would in turn overestimate test statistics, possibly 
portraying the coefficient as significant, while it in reality is suffering from autocorrelation. 
Variables such as ownership concentration, market capitalization and ownership identity are 
likely to remain fairly constant over time and would therefore display clear signs of 
autocorrelation. To account for this problem we use standard errors clustered by company, 
which is a type of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors (HAC). 
This allows for heteroskedasticity and for arbitrary autocorrelation (Stock and Watson, 
2012). Another method would have been to adjust for autocorrelation by running the 
regression based on changes between periods, rather than absolute values. This is not 
rational in our case since we would lose further observations.   
4.5.4 Endogeneity Problems  
The by far most critical assumption is the one involving exogenous regressors. If omitted 
variables have explanatory power and are correlated with one or more of the included 
variables, our regression will suffer from what is known as omitted variable bias.  
(Eq. 3) 
Eq. 3 explains the properties of the omitted variable bias. If not biased, the sample 
coefficient ( ) would converge towards the actual population coefficient when the sample 
size increases. On average these two coefficients would then be identical. If the model on the 
other hand suffers from endogeneity problems, these would not converge. How large the bias 
is depends on the correlation ) between the explanatory variables and the error term, the 
stronger the correlation, the larger the bias. It will also be linked to the variance in the 
omitted variable ( ) and the included variables . The direction depends on the 
correlation (   (Stock and Watson, 2012). In our model we have included the variables 
that we deem the most important. We are aware that there are several omitted variables with 
significant explanatory power, and we will as far as possible, elaborate on these in our 
analysis. 
 44 
Besides omitted variables, functional form misspecification and measurement errors in the 
independent explanatory variables will also lead to biased estimates. Furthermore, a sample 
selection bias arises when entities can only be observed based on their dependent variables, 
meaning that the error term is correlated with the dependent variable.  If the causality 
between the dependent and independent variable goes both ways we would have what is 
known as a simultaneous causality issue. The coefficients would in this case not reflect the 
true causal effect. Finally, panel data with several observations from different companies 
could have time invariant unobservable effects that bias the results. This is an important 
issue which we will revert to in section 4.7.  
4.6 Regression 
In order to decide what kind of model we should use, we run a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test for random effects. The ordinary least squares (OLS) model will only be 
appropriate if there are no significant differences across companies.  We reject the null 
hypothesis that there are no significant differences across entities at a 1 % level and use a RE 
model because it is more efficient than OLS. The test results are provided in Table 4. 
Table 4: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects  
 
Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 represent our final model, using identical variables for explaining the two 
performance measures, Tobin’s Q and return on assets. Keeping in mind that we are 
interested in whether government ownership influences performance, we have included 
identification variables as dummies. 
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(Eq. 4) 
 
                                                  (Eq. 5)          
4.7 Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects 
The RE model will only be preferred to the fixed effects (FE) model, if the random error is 
not correlated with any of the explanatory variables. The problem with endogenous 
regressors is common with panel data because the individual specific error term (ui) can be 
correlated with the explanatory variables (Xit). If this is the case, we will want to use the FE 
model, which produces consistent estimates.  
(Eq. 6)    
To decide which model to use one could conduct a Hausman test. The FE model eliminates 
the individual random effect (ui) and other time invariant factors, meaning that the FE model 
will be preferred if there is correlation. 
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, meaning that FE=RE estimates, we should use the RE 
model. The FE model does not utilize the information on how changes in the dependent 
variable over time for the different entities could be attributed to different variables for the 
same entities (in our case the different firms). The RE-model takes this into account, 
meaning that if the random errors (ui) are not correlated with our explanatory variables, we 
should use this model as it is more efficient. This is also supported by the fact that RE is a 
generalized least square procedure while FE is a least square estimator (Hill, Griffiths, and 
Lim, 2011). 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry is throughout the whole period, the largest shareholder in 
Cermaq, with a constant ownership share. As the FE model can only be used when analyzing 
the effect of variables that change, we are forced to use the RE model. 
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4.8 Results 
4.8.1 Random Effects Model for Tobin’s Q  
Table 5: Random Effects Model for Tobin’s Q 
 (1) 
 Tobin’s Q 
Hf -0.084 
 (0.265) 
  
Insider ownership 1.662*** 
 (0.269) 
  
Insider ownership^2 -0.624 
 (0.859) 
  
State 0.318 
 (0.272) 
  
Individual  0.256 
 (0.162) 
  
International 0.401 
 (0.434) 
  
Financial 0.774*** 
 (0.238) 
  
Lnmcap 0.338*** 
 (0.052) 
  
Constant -2.016*** 
 (0.571) 
Observations 199 
Adjusted R2 0.188 
 
Note: The results for the dependent variable Tobin’s Q (market value of equity and debt)/(total assets) using Non-financial owners as 
reference. Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index, sum of squared ownership top 20 owners) Insider ownership is measured as 
fraction shares owned by the board and management. The insider squared is meant to pick up any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. 
State, Individual, International, Financial and Non-financial is the identity of the largest shareholder. LnMcap is the natural logarithm of 
the companies’ market capitalization measured in million NOK.  Results are based on a group of companies,  consisting of CEQ, MHG, 
LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
We choose to investigate ownership identities by setting non-financial owners as a reference, 
and the results are shown in Table 5.  Most identities show a non-significant effect and only 
financial owners have a statistically significant effect on Tobin’s Q. We have no reason to 
believe that government ownership neither over- nor underperforms international, individual 
and non-financial owners. However, since government ownership is not statistically different 
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from zero, but financial ownership is, we can conclude that the government as an owner 
(along with all other ownership identities) underperforms relative to financial owners. But 
we have to be careful when reading our estimates as the number of observations will be 
highly relevant for the significance of our results. It will not be meaningful performing 
further hypothesis tests as only one ownership identity has a statically significant effect. 
It is also worth mentioning that ownership concentration is not statistically significant. 
Insider ownership is associated with higher values of Tobin’s Q and the effect is statistic 
significant at a 1% level. Squared insider ownership has a non-significant effect but the 
accumulated effect of insider holdings will be positive. Market capitalization is significantly 
associated with better financial performance, reflecting both the importance of size and the 
previous highlighted correlation with the market-to-book ratio. Complete results are 
provided in Table A7.1 in Appendix 7. 
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4.8.2 Random Effects Model for Return on Assets  
Table 6: Random Effects Model for Return on Assets 
 (1) 
  ROA 
Hf -0.024 
 (0.027) 
  
Insider ownership 0.014 
 (0.088) 
  
Insider ownership^2 -0.011 
 (0.111) 
  
State -0.010 
 (0.008) 
  
Individual  -0.008 
 (0.019) 
  
International -0.024** 
 (0.012) 
  
Financial -0.002 
 (0.010) 
  
Lnmcap 0.008** 
 (0.003) 
  
Constant -0.035 
 (0.033) 
Observations 199 
Adjusted R2 0.057 
 
Note: The results for the dependent variable ROA (net income/average total assets) using Non-financial owners as reference. Explanatory 
variables: Hf (Herfindahl index, sum of squared ownership top 20 owners) Insider ownership is measured as fraction shares owned by the 
board and management. The insider squared is meant to pick up any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. State, Individual, International, 
Financial and Non-financial is the identity of the largest shareholder. LnMcap is the natural logarithm of the companies’ market 
capitalization measured in million NOK. Results are based on a group of companies,  consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, 
AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
In Table 6 we have provided the results for the analysis with return on assets as the 
dependent variable, still using non-financial owners as reference. Neither here, does 
government ownership display a significant effect. This is also true for the other identities, 
except for international owners, who are associated with lower return on assets at a 5 percent 
level. Using the same analogy the only conclusion we can derive is that the government 
outperforms international owners.  Ownership concentration is still not statistically 
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significant, but neither are the two insider ownership variables. The positive effect of size is 
also in the terms of return on assets strongly significant. See Table A7.2 in Appendix 7. 
4.9 Summarized Results of Government Ownership  
Neither of our models reveal any statistically significant effects of government ownership.  
Because the government effect is not significantly different from zero and other ownership 
identities neither are significant this means that the identity of the owner is irrelevant with 
regards to financial performance. But there are two exceptions:  financial owners outperform 
all other ownership identities in terms of Tobin’s Q, and international owners underperform 
in terms of return on assets. 
If this was an industry where the identity of the largest shareholder was constantly changing, 
it would have made sense to lag performance and detect possible delayed reactions. But 
given the constant ownership structure in aquaculture, this would only have reduced the 
number of observations, providing no additional value. 
Since we want to problematize further, we wish to study the effects when using government 
ownership as the only ownership identity variable. This will allow us to measure government 
ownership against the industry average. 
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Table 7: Random Effects Model with All Other Identities as Reference 
 (1) (2) 
  ROA, all identities as 
reference 
Tobin’s Q, all identites as 
reference 
Hf -0.015 -0.333 
 (0.025) (0.228) 
   
Insider ownership 0.020 1.826*** 
 (0.059) (0.522) 
   
Insider ownership^2 -0.026 -0.755 
 (0.100) (0.908) 
   
State -0.007 0.050 
 (0.017) (0.339) 
   
Lnmcap 0.011*** 0.324*** 
 (0.003) (0.030) 
   
Constant -0.073** -1.581*** 
 (0.029) (0.278) 
Observations 199 199 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.243 
 
Note: Regression 1: The results for the dependent variable ROA (net income/average total assets) using all other owners as reference. 
Regression 2: The results for the dependent variable Tobin’s Q (market value of equity and debt)/(total assets) using all other owners as 
reference. Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index, sum of squared ownership top 20 owners) Insider ownership is measured as 
fraction shares owned by the board and management. The insider squared is meant to pick up any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. 
State is the only ownership identity variable. Ln mcap is the natural logarithm of the companies’ market capitalization measured in million 
NOK. Results are based on a group of companies,  consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and 
COP. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table 7 summarizes these findings. We do still not find any significant results, but the 
coefficients are small, both in terms of Tobin’s Q and return on assets, implying that even if 
they were significant the effect would have been limited. This supports our impression that 
government ownership is insignificant in relation to financial performance for companies 
operating within the aquaculture industry. 
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4.10 Criticism of Empirical Approach 
Critics of corporate governance studies often emphasize the endogenity problem linked to 
ownership and performance. It is not certain that the implied causality link goes from 
ownership to performance. Financial performance could also determine ownership identity 
(Demzets, 1983).This illustrates how important it is having a sound theoretical foundation, 
as econometrical analysis only describes certain relationships. 
Since the government ownership share is time invariant, we cannot use the FE model. If we 
were to do so, the government ownership share would have been left out of the regression 
since this does not change over time. This implies that we must be cautious when 
interpreting results, as they will rely on the vital assumption that there is no correlation 
between our included variables and unobserved firm-specific fixed effects. There are 
countless unobservable fixed variables, which may explain the company’s current 
performance, and if any of these have large explanatory power it will be an obvious 
weakness, when using the RE model. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) mention for 
example corporate culture and market power as examples of such effects. 
We would once again like to stress the fact that the number of observations in all likelihood 
has impacted our result. We are restricted by the date of Cermaq`s listing, but with a larger 
amount of observations it is possible that we would have found significant effects. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
In this chapter we will investigate our results further and look at possible explanations. We 
will start with the already included variables, before addressing the endogeneity problem by 
discussing several omitted variables that could impact the explanatory power of government 
ownership. This discussion will serve as the foundation for our overall conclusion. 
5.1 Government Ownership 
Running the RE-model, government ownership seems to have a non-significant effect. This 
means that we, on the basis of our regression, cannot conclude that government ownership 
has had a systematic impact on Cermaq’s performance. 
The selection of time period is crucial and if the data sample is not representative, our 
overall conclusion can turn out to be wrong. Until now we have analyzed the time period as 
a whole but we will in the following identify different intervals and investigate these 
individually. Given the cyclicality of the aquaculture industry we would like to find out if the 
effect of government ownership changes over time. 
In earlier decades, decease-outbreaks led to erratic supply, and it was not until vaccines were 
introduced during the 1990’s that supply became stable and one was made aware of this 
cyclicality (Andersen, Tveterås, and Roll, 2008). The cyclicality is mainly explained by a 
relatively constant cost structure, and varying retail prices (Øglend and Sikveland, 2008). In 
total, these two effects result in a fluctuating EBIT-margin, meaning that the real return per 
kg of salmon is cyclical. Biological limitations will amplify this effect, as it will typically 
take 2-3 years before one can harvest a fully-grown salmon. This is putting constraints on 
short-term supply, and fish farmers setting out smolt, will not be able to reap the economic 
profit until several years later. This time lag can also cause producers to overestimate future 
supply, driving down future prices. The aquaculture industry is in most countries strictly 
regulated due to environmental concerns. In Norway, one of the most important limitations 
 53 
is the one related to the allowed biomass per square feet (MTB). These regulations
18
 limit the 
opportunity to stockpile fish in anticipation of higher prices, possibly causing misalignment 
between supply and demand. Seasonal effect will also affect the supply-demand equilibrium, 
as smolt usually is released into the pens during late summer and autumn, when growth 
conditions are optimal. 
A cycle within the salmon farming industry is typically 6 years from peak to peak, or 3 years 
from peak to trough. Consensus among analysts seems to be that 2006 and 2011 where peaks 
in terms of EBIT/kg, and using this cycle framework we define 3 different periods: (i) peak-
to-trough, (ii) through-to-peak and (iii) peak-to-peak. Table 7 shows our periodic results with 
return on assets as the dependent variable. 
Table 8: Random Effects Model for Different Business Cycles 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  ROA, 2006-2008 ROA, 2009-2011 ROA 2006-2011 
Hf -0.040 -0.030 0.020 
 (0.029) (0.061) (0.041) 
    
Insider ownership 0.170*** -0.085 -0.041 
 (0.060) (0.128) (0.086) 
    
Insider ownership^2 -0.250** 0.184 0.055 
 (0.103) (0.199) (0.150) 
    
State 0.025*** -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.032) 
    
Lnmcap -0.002 0.014** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
    
Constant 0.022 -0.078 -0.122*** 
 (0.048) (0.057) (0.043) 
Observations 51 84 132 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.104 0.126 
 
Note: Regression 1: peak to trough. Regression 2: trough to peak. Regression 3: peak to peak. The results for the dependent variable ROA 
(net income/average total assets) using all other owners as reference. Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index, sum of squared 
ownership top 20 owners) Insider ownership is measured as fraction shares owned by the board and management. The insider squared is 
meant to pick up any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. State is the only ownership identity variable. Ln mcap is the natural logarithm 
of the companies’ market capitalization measured in million NOK. Results are based on a group of companies,  consisting of CEQ, MHG, 
LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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 As of today, the allowed biomass is limited to no more than 65 tons of fish per 1000 m3. A standard license 
of 1200m3 therefore equals 78 tons. Troms and Finnmark have higher limits due to lower organic growth. 
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During the first period (column 1 in Table 8), lasting from 2006 until 2008, government 
ownership displays a positive and statistically significant effect on return on assets. This is 
interesting as it tells us that government ownership will be preferred during down-cycles, 
and could be related to the fact that the government is a stable owner that does not stress 
performance-measures during a period where profits are low. Private investors may become 
impatient as the company delivers a result below their required return, especially if these 
down-cycles correspond with recessions in the economy (as was the case in 2008). 
Publically owned companies will not experience the same kind of pressure and sense of 
discontent, as their largest shareholder has the necessary financial strength and time horizon. 
Being owned by the government could also be interpreted as having an implicit government 
guarantee, which would be especially valuable in periods when profits are low. 
Looking at the second period of 2009-2011 (column 2 in Table 8), the effect of government 
ownership is no longer significant.  From peak to peak (column 3 in Table 8), the effect is 
line with our previous presented results, thus not-significant in any direction. Results for 
Tobin’s Q were non-significant and are provided in Appendix 8. 
We observe that financial owners are the only ownership identity to have a significantly 
positive effect on performance. Havfisk, among the companies performing worst in terms of 
Tobin’s Q, is the only company having a financial owner.  Considering the other 
characteristics of Havfisk, we suspect that this observed positive relationship between 
financial ownership and performance is manipulated by other firm specific factors rather 
than the identity of the largest shareholder. Having a small market capitalization and high 
ownership concentration, which both point in the direction of a low Tobin’s Q, the model 
may have assigned the identity variable excessive explanatory power. This highlights the 
weakness of having a small number of observations as the model may indicate spurious 
relationships. 
Another quite striking finding is that international ownership displays a significantly 
negative effect, but in this case with respects to the return on assets. International owners are 
for a number of reasons assumed to be passive owners, thus theory suggests a negative effect 
on corporate governance and performance.  Using a statistical test, we were able to trace the 
larger part of this negative effect back to Marine Harvest, one out of two companies having 
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foreign owners (SSC is the second). Marine Harvest is 23.1 percent owned by Geveran 
Trading Ltd
19
, a holding company that through a crafty ownership structure is owned and 
controlled by, former Norwegian turned Cypriot, business magnate John Fredriksen. 
Fredriksen is known as a shareholder-friendly owner; perhaps more concerned with 
continuous dividend payments than year-to-year profits. The last couple of years, Marine 
Harvest have also been among the most active acquirers within the industry and this is 
believed to have negative effects on short-term performance. This once again reminds us of 
the importance of the number of observations. Although the number is satisfactory on an 
aggregate level, this will not necessarily be the case if studying specific ownership identities. 
As we have argued, company-specific characteristics can influence the explanatory power of 
a whole identity-group.  
We will not elaborate further, on results of ownership identities, but we will revert to other 
aspects of Cermaq’s business environment, which may or may not affect the impact of 
government ownership in a way that our model has not picked up.  
5.2 Other Ownership Characteristics 
Our model displays a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance, but the effect is small and not statistically significant. The theory regarding 
ownership concentration is indecisive, but there seems to be a common understanding that 
concentration will have positive effects up until a certain level (Schleifer and Vishny, 1996).  
The average Herfindahl index for the entire peer group is 0.251, with the largest owner 
holding an average of 43.7 percent (both figures excluding CEQ). These numbers are high 
compared to the Oslo Stock Exchange All, where these numbers are 0.15 and 27.6 percent, 
respectively. The slightly negative effect on Tobin’s Q, can be interpreted as a possible 
minority discount, signalizing that the market believes the concentration is somewhat to 
high. A similar effect is seen on return on assets, indicating that ownership concentration has 
influenced decision-making. But as neither of these effects (-0.084 on Tobin’s Q, and -0.024 
on ROA) are statistically significant we will be careful with making any sort of conclusions, 
especially given the high standard deviation.  
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 Geveran Trading Ltd. is a holding company based in Limasol, Cyprus. It is operated as a subsidiary of 
Greenwich Holding Ltd., and controlled by John Fredriksen. 
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Insider ownership is a way of aligning incentives and as it reduces problems related to moral 
hazard, the theory suggests a positive relationship between insider ownership and 
performance. We find a positive link, but the results are only statistically significant for 
Tobin’s Q.  The market regards it as positive if insiders own shares in their own company. 
With Tobin’s Q taking the market value into account, it therefore makes sense that we 
observe a stronger relationship with this performance measure, than with return on assets. 
In the aquaculture industry, the high degree of insider ownership can be explained by the fact 
that several companies are family owned, and that these families also are represented at the 
management- or board-level. Cermaq has a small share of 0.5 percent insider ownership. 
This could possibly be explained by the restrictive use of option schemes and share based 
remuneration, but the obvious explanation is the absence of family ownership. In comparison 
the peer group has an average insider holding of 21.7 percent (excluded CEQ), meaning that 
this variable alone would imply a lower Tobin’s Q for Cermaq. 
Our model finds that the market capitalization of the firm has a statistically significant effect 
on both performance-measures (0.338 for Tobin’s Q and 0.008 for return on assets). 
Although it might be difficult to spot the immediate effect that size will have on 
performance, the aquaculture industry is characterized by a high degree of consolidation. 
This suggests that there is some kind of threshold with regards to size; unless a firm is of a 
certain size it will likely be difficult to compete with the larger and more established firms. 
Benefitting from economies of scale will have obvious effects on performance, improving 
effectiveness and resulting in both increased return on assets and market to book ratios. To 
demonstrate this fact we divide the peer group into two brackets: (i) large-cap with a market 
value of more than NOK 4 bn, and (ii) small-cap with a market value less than NOK 4 bn. 
Looking at return on assets, large-cap performs significantly
20
 better than small-cap, 
boasting an average ROA of 8.5 percent (vs 3.2 percent). The effect is similar with regards 
to Tobin’s Q.  
The last twelve months have been quite fast paced with respect to consolidation and 
acquisitions. Marine Harvest acquired Morpol in 2012 and attempted to acquire Cermaq in 
mid-2013. China Fishery Group successfully acquired Copeinca, after Cermaq’s proposed 
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 We run a “ttest” command in stata, testing if the return on assets of large companies is statistically different 
from that of small companies. We reject the null hypothesis that these are equal, based on a t-value of 5.06. 
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acquisition attempt was voted down
21
. These cases illustrate how important consolidation is 
within this particular industry. If growth is driven by constant acquisitions, this may have 
negative effects on performance. In the short run, implementation will be time consuming, 
thus preventing the company from focusing solely on maximizing profits. In the long run it 
may have obvious negative effects if it turns out that the acquirer has paid out a too large 
premium, compared to the actual synergies. Geographical (horizontal) expansion is found to 
lower production risk and risk on returns in the aquaculture industry (Tveterås and Asche, 
2011) .  
Market capitalization constitutes, together with debt, the denominator of Tobin’s Q.  It is 
therefore highly anticipated that our model will detect a positive relationship. This is 
undoubtedly a weakness. That being said we prove a strong relationship between size and 
return on assets, a performance measure which in principle is not dependent on the market 
capitalization. This means that there are advantages to size, although they are not as large as 
the coefficient implies.  
5.3 Capital Structure and Dividend Policy 
As we are measuring relative performance we are interested in how Cermaq is capitalized 
compared to its peers, and if the company due to its capital structure either has a competitive 
advantage or disadvantage. In terms of capital structure Cermaq is among the least levered 
companies within the peer group, exhibiting a low debt-to-equity ratio. This is not 
surprising, as the government repeatedly has expressed their preference for a solid and 
reasonable capital structure. Theoretically, a lower leverage ratio would imply that Cermaq 
has a larger free cash flow problem and hence higher agency costs than its competitors and 
this should have a negative effect on performance. Figure 4 displays the debt-to-equity ratio, 
plotting Cermaq against the median and average of the peer group. 
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After submitting an offer for Cermaq, Marine Harvest managed to gather enough support to block the share 
issue that was necessary for financing the acquisition of Copeinca.   
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Figure 4: Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
Note: The debt to equity ratio is defined as total book value of debt divided by stockholder’s equity and can be understood as the 
proportions of equity and debt the company uses to finance its assets. We have computed an average, including all companies except CEQ. 
The median is based on all companies, including CEQ. 
 
Despite Miller and Modigliani (1958) claiming that capitalization is irrelevant, it can be 
argued that every company has an optimal capital structure
22
, determined by the trade-off 
between the positive and negative effects of debt. If Cermaq does have a less than ideal debt 
ratio, then the peer group must on an average have a close-to-optimal capital structure if it is 
going to impact the relative performance negatively. If we divide the peer group into three 
brackets (high, medium and low) based on the debt ratio, we see that the largest and perhaps 
most comparable companies in terms of size, type of business and maturity are found 
together with Cermaq in the bracket with the lowest debt ratio. Based on these observations, 
Cermaq seems to have a reasonable capital structure and since firm specific characteristics 
will impact the optimal level of debt, this will probably justify a lower leverage ratio. 
Furthermore, both the average and median debt-to-equity ratio seem to display a downward 
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 Based on the acknowledged theory by Miller & Modigliani (1958), firm value is unaffected by the leverage 
ratio since the intrinsic firm value is determined by its assets and the fact that all financing activities have an 
NPV equal to zero. However, this theory is derived upon a set of assumptions (for example neutral taxation and 
no bankruptcy costs) that does not hold empirically. In fact, the violation of two of these assumptions has 
become known as the classic tradeoff theory of debt, the tradeoff being value added from tax shield (and 
reduced agency costs) versus bankruptcy costs that are both positively correlated with the leverage ratio. This 
trade off determines the optimal capital structure. As leveraging the company increases the risk of default, the 
negative effects of debt will at a certain point outweigh the positive effects. Since we assume that capital 
markets are efficient, this will be reflected in the market price/share price. 
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trend, approaching Cermaq’s leverage ratio. We would therefore not expect our results to be 
biased in either direction. See Appendix 9.   
As a closing remark on capital structure, it is also worth mentioning that companies with 
unusual debt values may have artificially volatile or stable Tobin’s Q multiples. If the 
amount of debt is small, then the multiple will fluctuate with the market cap, displaying a 
correspondingly volatile pattern. If the amount of debt on the other hand is extensive, then 
Tobin’s Q is likely to be artificially stable, as fluctuations in market value only will have a 
limited effect. However, this will not apply to the companies in our peer group. 
Another topic closely related to capital structure is the company’s dividend payments. 
Dividend payments have proven to be a sweetener making shares with high dividend yields 
and payout ratios more attractive, and hence increasing market capitalization
23
. In this 
context we are interested in whether the dividend policy of Cermaq is systematically 
different from that of the other companies within the peer group. We have analyzed each 
company’s dividend policy in terms of both payout ratio and dividend yield.  
Historically Cermaq has been roughly in line with the median in terms of payout ratio. 
During 2011 and 2012 however, Cermaq has paid out a significantly larger percentage of net 
profits.  This can possibly be explained by the fact that the board in December 2010 revised 
the company’s dividend policy, raising the targeted payout ratio from 30 percent to a range 
of 30-50 percent. However, looking at the annual payout ratio in an industry as cyclical as 
fish farming can be quite deceiving, as profits are likely to be volatile, resulting in 
discontinuous dividend payments. Looking at accumulated dividend payments, as a 
percentage of net total profits Cermaq is in line with the median, having distributed 39.2 
percent.  
The dividend yield is perhaps a more reliable benchmark since it is measured against the 
current share price. Figure 5 plots the dividend yield of Cermaq against the peer group. A 
complete overview of dividend policies is provided in Appendix 10. 
                                                 
23 Companies controlled by John Fredriksen are often known for their generous dividend policy, paying out unnecessary 
equity as dividends and financing operations through extensive lending.  
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Figure 5: Dividend Yield 
Note: Dividend yield for companies within Cermaq’s peer group. The dividend yield is calculated as annual (total) dividend payments 
divided by the average market value (average of opening and closing market value of the company’s equity). The average is calculated 
based on all companies, except CEQ. 
 
All in all, peers seem to be quite evenly distributed around Cermaq in terms of dividend 
payments. This leads us to believe that Cermaq’s dividend policy will not affect our results, 
as the company does not stand out in any particular direction. In a similar way, arguments 
relating to the disciplining effect of dividend payments will be irrelevant, as Cermaq’s 
dividend payments are normal. 
5.4 Liquidity 
With government ownership often being of a certain magnitude, it will possibly affect the 
turnover rate as the number of free floating
24
 shares decreases. A lower turnover rate can in 
turn affect the market capitalization because the share becomes less liquid (Bøhren, 2005). 
Illiquid shares are usually trading at a discount, reflecting the fact that the investment cannot 
easily be sold at a competitive market price. However, concentrated long-term ownership 
does not necessarily have to affect the turnover rate, as trade in the remaining shares may 
pick up.  
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 The number of free floating shares is calculated by comparing the shares readily available in the market 
relative to the total amount of shares outstanding. 
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What we are trying to say is that illiquid companies may have an artificially low Tobin’s Q, 
as the market value component is traded at a discount that does not necessarily reflect 
underlying performance. Looking at the annualized turnover rate
25
 provided by the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, the degree of ownership concentration and turnover seem to be negatively 
correlated
26
, meaning that companies controlled by one large owner will have a low turnover 
rate. In that sense, Cermaq is surprisingly liquid with a turnover rate in 2013 of 64.6 percent, 
a sign that government ownership does not affect the turnover negatively compared to other 
companies in the industry. However, the observed rate may be biased by unusually high 
turnover in association with the rally following Marine Harvests acquisition attempt, and the 
government increasing its ownership. But the turnover rate for other companies is likely to 
be biased in the same direction
27
, as they have been part of a rallying Seafood Index. 
Measures of turnover are summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9: Turnover Measures for Cermaq and Peers 
Note: Measures describing the daily and annual turnover for CEQ and peers, sorted by turnover rate. Mcap and daily turnover is measured 
in NOK million, Largest owner is the ownership share of the largest shareholder as of 31.10.2013. Both daily turnover and annual turnover 
rate has been gathered from Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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 The annual turnover rate is calculated as the number of shares traded so far this year (annualized) as a 
percentage of the number of registered shares (as of 11. November 2013). 
26
 Testing the relationship in Stata we find a negative correlation of 0.66. A regression using only turnover and 
largest shareholder displays a significant negative effect of ownership concentration (Coefficient of -1.37 with 
a t-value  -2.68 and a constant of 1.17). 
27
 Marine Harvest acquired more than 25 percent of the shares in Grieg Seafood in November 2013, and China 
Fishery Group bought all outstanding shares in Copeinca. 
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Liquidity will only impact our results if a low turnover rate has resulted in a lower market 
capitalization. As Cermaq is among the largest seafood companies on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange and seem to have a turnover rate that is among the best within its peer group, we 
conclude that liquidity is no issue and that our results in this respect should be reliable. 
5.5 Incentive Schemes 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, remuneration of executive managers has been devoted 
much attention, and the government has urged companies to show moderation concerning 
this matter, especially those being publically owned. If this means that companies such as 
Cermaq are obstructed from offering executive managers and other key personnel 
competitive conditions, they risk (i) not getting hold of qualified employees, and (ii) not 
properly incentivizing current management. In order to discuss potential differences, we 
have studied the four largest companies measured in terms of market capitalization: Marine 
Harvest, Cermaq, Lerøy and SalMar.  
Looking at the fixed annual salary, Cermaq is the company that pays the lowest 
compensation. But in order to get a sense of how different the respective remuneration-
policies really are
28
, we turn to the information that the companies have disclosed in their 
annual reports. Table 10 summarizes these differences while a complete overview is 
provided in Appendix 11.  
Table 10: Executive Remuneration Policies 
Note: Policies regarding executive remuneration for CEQ, MHG, LSG and SALM. Bonus limit is the maximum cash bonus, measured as a 
percentage of the annual base salary. Option scheme is whether the company practices option programs where executive managers are 
given options. The same analogy goes for share programs. Severance limit is the maximum amount which can be given as severance 
payment, measured as the normal monthly salary. All numbers are gathered from the respective 2012 Annual Reports. 
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 These figures are gathered from the 2012 annual reports and the CEO of Cermaq, Jon Hindar, did not take 
office until the 19
th
 of March that year. The base salaries in both Lerøy (+12%) and Salmar (+17%) are roughly 
in line with Cermaq, but we will not read too much into this as the figure for Cermaq likely is biased. 
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Most striking is the difference with regards to limitations on the cash bonus. While Lerøy 
can pay an annual performance-based bonus equal to 100 percent of the fixed salary, Cermaq 
on the other hand, can only pay a bonus constituting maximum 30 percent. In Marine 
Harvest, executive managers may through a share price based scheme receive an annual total 
bonus, accounting for as much as 200 percent of their annual fixed salary. SalMar has a more 
similar policy, but the tendency is that Cermaq offers less generous remuneration-terms than 
its competitors. This becomes even more evident as we consider the fact that Cermaq utilizes 
few option schemes and no share based remuneration 
Variations in performance-based compensation mean that we quite possibly have managers 
that are not equally incentivized. This would imply that Cermaq, due to its less lucrative 
bonus scheme, should perform worse than its competitors. But incentive schemes may also 
have less fortunate effects such as risk-taking, and this must be considered when evaluating 
the different remuneration policies. 
We know that the government will try to act as a professional owner, letting the management 
and the board run the company. This being said, there are several examples of the 
government intervening when the company’s actions are in violation with their guidelines. 
This was the case when Cermaq was attempted acquired by Marine Harvest previously this 
year
29
. 
It is obvious why managers in publically owned companies generally would want to follow 
the guidelines laid down by the government. Too much negative publicity may result in a 
loss of reputation, but perhaps more importantly the loss of focus, which will impact daily 
operations. The possible negative effects resulting from Cermaq’s executive remuneration 
policy, will likely have been influenced by the government and may have impacted 
performance. 
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 In connection with the sale of EWOS, the group management was given success-based stay-onboard bonuses 
equaling 6 months’ salary. This bonus came in addition to the ordinary annual bonus of 30 percent of annual 
salary, bringing the potential bonus for 2013 to a maximum of 80 percent. This conflicted with the 
government’s guidelines, and to make matters worse, the government was not informed. Consulting with their 
own legal advisors, the company had decided that it was not necessary to inform the shareholders about this 
extraordinary bonus at the general meeting.  
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5.6 Limitations 
In working with this paper, we have noticed how complex the issue of different ownership 
identities is. There are countless unobservable time fixed effects, which could have been 
accounted for using a Fixed Effects model. However, since the government ownership share 
is constant throughout the whole period this is no option, but we recognize that this could 
have improved the quality and accuracy of our results. 
Furthermore, the identity of owners is not as clear-cut as we have portrayed it in this paper. 
We have used a relatively simple classification framework, and this means that a specific 
owner appearing to be of a certain type could have been given a different classification. But 
it is hard to defend a complex classification with a limited number of observations. An 
example is Austevoll Seafood, which is 55.6 percent owned by Laco AS. This may at a first 
sight seem like a financial owner, but as we investigate further we come to realize that 
LACO is the private investment company of the Møgster family. This means that LACO in 
our classification framework has been classified as individual, while one could also argue 
that it is financial owner. 
In our paper we have only measured insider holdings as shares held my members of 
management and the board. The Oslo Stock Exchange operates with a much broader 
definition, comprising accountants, legal and financial advisors, firms with representatives 
on the board etc. This is another simplification that may have affected our results, and could 
have been solved by looking at mandatory notifications of trade. An example is once again 
Austevoll, which because of its ownership is an insider in Lerøy Seafood Group, under the 
label “Firms represented on the board”. 
Another weakness is the fact that ownership can be distributed over several different 
shareholdings in the same company. Investors may have numerous reasons for disguising the 
real extent of their ownership, and investing through several different companies mean that 
ownership is more concentrated than it would appear. Investors may also hold shares through 
nominee accounts, meaning that an investment bank will be listed as the owner of these 
shares. 
It is a chance that capital markets may overreact, referred to as noise. This is a weakness in 
empirical studies that are using market values. One can also imagine a situation where it is 
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the share price that determines the identity of the largest shareholder, not the other way 
around. 
5.7 Suggestions for Future Research 
Common for all previous studies on government ownership, is that it takes on the 
shareholder perspective. We have argued that it would have been ideal to study this issue 
from a broader social economic perspective, and this is an interesting basis for future 
research. Such a study could provide much needed empirical evidence on how government 
ownership affects the society as a whole, taking several aspects, externalities and 
stakeholders into account when measuring the effects. 
Earlier research generally investigates the effects of government ownership through more 
comprehensive corporate governance studies. We have tried to go as in-depth as possible, by 
focusing on only one publically owned company in one industry. This means that it is 
possible to perform the same kind of study in different industries, perhaps focusing on a 
sector which the government is even more attached to and likely to conduct an active 
ownership policy in. 
It could also be interesting to empirically study how government ownership is exercised in 
different countries. It would be preferable to look at comparable countries, with somewhat 
similar attitudes towards ownership – for example the Scandinavian countries. 
Finally, we have only studied the effects of government ownership after the company was 
listed. It could therefore have been interesting to look closer at the process of privatization, 
studying effects pre- and post-listing. Being a wholly owned public company is very 
different from being exposed to market competition, and by looking at the effects of such a 
listing, one could get a clear indication of how these different ownership structures affect 
performance. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have empirically investigated the effects of government ownership on 
financial performance. We have done this by examining two different performance 
measures, namely Tobin’s Q and the return on assets, for the period of 2005-2012. Our 
research is based on quarterly data from 11 different seafood companies listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange.  
We run a Random Effects model and our results do not indicate that government ownership 
has any significant effect on performance. When dividing into different time intervals, based 
on business cycles, we see that government ownership will have a positive effect on return 
on assets during down-cycles. As theory suggests a negative relationship between 
government ownership and performance, our results indicate that The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry through its ownership in Cermaq have been successful at conducting a hands-off 
policy in line with what they have stated in the 2012 State Ownership Report. We cannot 
predict how government ownership will influence performance in other industries, but within 
aquaculture we can conclude that there will not be any difference associated with being 
publically owned.  
Since we started writing this paper the Norwegian people has elected a new government, 
which supposedly is more restrictive in its attitude towards government ownership. If the 
new government chooses to reduce its shareholdings in certain companies, it will be 
interesting to study the observed effect on financial performance. This kind of study could 
provide additional understanding on the effects of government ownership.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions and Vocabulary 
In the following we have supplied a brief explanation of some of the words and phrases used 
in this paper.  We assume that this vocabulary will be well-known to the average reader, and 
it is only included for pedagogical purposes. Definitions are freely reproduced, using 
Investopedia as the primary source. 
A-shares and B-shares: Securities can be issued in different formats and may have different 
characteristics. The most common distinction is that between A-shares, which have voting 
rights and B-shares, which typically have no voting rights. 
Asset substitution: Asset substitution occurs when the management is incentivized to take 
on risk, while having limited exposure to the downside. The company exchanges its low-risk 
assets (typically cash) for high-risk investments and this transfers value from the 
bondholders to the shareholders. 
Autocorrelation: This occurs if observations over time are dependent on previous 
observations, and is a common problem when studying time series.  
Causality: Causality refers to situations where one event is caused by a second effect, hence 
the event can be understood as a consequence. 
Controlling minority: A controlling minority controls no less than one third of the company 
and can block decisions that require 2/3 of the votes at the general meeting.  
Corporate Governance: Corporate governance is related to how investors may protect their 
invested capital. The quality of the current corporate governance is determined by the 
statutory shareholder protection and characteristics of several government mechanisms, such 
as insider ownership, ownership concentration and financial policy. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): CSR relates to the corporate initiative to assess and 
take responsibility for the company's effects on the environment and impact on social 
welfare. It is usually not used to describe efforts that are required by law. 
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Debt-to-Equity Ratio: This is a measure of the company’s financial leverage, and indicates 
the proportion of debt to equity. A ratio of for example 3:1 means that the company is 
financed with 3 dollars of debt for every dollar of equity. 
EBIT-margin: The EBIT-margin is the company’s operating income measured as a 
percentage of revenues. The company’s Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) is a well-
suited measure for comparing companies, mainly because it does not take into account how 
the company is financed. 
Endogeniety:  Endogeniety arises when explanatory variables in the regression are 
correlated with the error term (the remainder term). 
Entrenchment effect: Describing the entrenchment effect we find it best to cite Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989): "By making manager-specific investments, managers can reduce the 
probability of being replaced, extract higher wages and larger perquisites from 
shareholders, and obtain more latitude in determining corporate strategy.” 
Fish farming:  Is the main form of aquaculture, where fish is bred in tanks or enclosures. 
This reduces problems related to overfishing, but disease outbreaks may represent a threat to 
the wild stock. 
Follow or explain principle: Publically owned companies are expected to either follow the 
guidelines laid out by the government, or on their own initiative explain why they have 
deviated from them. 
Free Cash Flow: The free cash flow is the cash flow available to all stakeholders, including 
both shareholders and creditors. It is calculated as the tax-adjusted operating profit before 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) subtracted capital expenditure (CAPEX) and net 
change in working capital. 
Free cash flow problem: This problem arises when the free cash flow is large, and the 
management is tempted to invest in projects that have a return that is less than the investor’s 
required return, meaning the return of the best alternative investment. 
Free floating shares: The number of free-floating shares is calculated as shares readily 
available in the market as a percentage of total shares outstanding. This will serve as a 
measure of how liquid the company is. 
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Free rider problem: The free rider problem describes a situation where some individuals 
either consume more than their fair share of a common resource, or pay less than their share 
of the cost. Considering corporate governance, this relates to the fact that investors holding a 
small ownership share will not have the necessary incentives for carrying out active 
monitoring, but will benefit from the fact that larger investors do. 
Hedge fund: A hedge fund is a certain type of fund, which aggressively manages its 
portfolio of investments. In order to generate high returns, a hedge fund utilizes advanced 
investment strategies such as levered, long, short and derivative positions. 
Herfindahl index: Most commonly used as a measure of ownership concentration. It is 
calculated as the sum of the squared ownerships of all stockholders in a company. 
Heteroskedasticity:  Means that two variables are different and is within econometrics used 
to describe whether the error term is constant or varies with observations. 
IFRS accounting standard: International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is a 
common international accounting standard dictating how different items should be treated in 
the financial statement. 
Insider: An insider is anyone who possesses more information about a specific company 
than the rest of the capital market. Primary insiders are usually members of management and 
the board of directors, but other insiders may include lawyers, financial consultants etc. 
Interpolating: Interpolating is a method of estimating unknown observations in between two 
observed values. One could increase the dataset by assuming a linear relationship between 
the two observed values. 
Intrinsic value: An asset’s intrinsic value represents its actual (underlying) value. This value 
can be different than the market value and investors can earn a return by identifying 
companies that are not correctly priced. 
Leverage ratio: There are several different ratios used when addressing a company’s capital 
structure. Leverage ratio usually refers to the ratio between debt and total assets, interpreted 
as the amount of debt that is used to finance the company’s assets. 
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Market efficiency: There are different degrees of market efficiency, depending on how 
much information that is reflected in the share price. Different theories claim that financial 
market efficiency is weak, semi-strong or strong.  
Market failure: Market failure is defined as a situation where the quantity of a product 
demanded by the consumers does not equal the quantity supplied by producers. Hence, the 
free market cannot provide an efficient allocation of goods and services. Market failure is a 
reason for government intervention. 
Minority interest: A minority interest in a company is a significant but non-controlling 
ownership of less than 50 percent of a company's voting shares. These shares can be held 
either by a private investor or another company.  
Moral hazard: A concept closely related to the principal agent problem. It revolves around 
the fact that a party to a transaction knows very little about the incentives of the other party. 
The risk is that this party has not entered into the contract in good faith, has provided 
misleading information or has an incentive to take unnecessary risks. 
Multicollinearity: This is the case if two or more of the explanatory variables in a regression 
are highly correlated. This may cause unreliable results that may seem strange when looking 
at the variables individually. 
NBIM: Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) is the asset management unit of the 
Norwegian central bank. It is responsible for managing the Government Pension Fund 
Global, which currently has a market value close to NOK 5,000 billion, in addition to most 
of the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. 
Pension fund Established by an employer in order to organize the investment of retirement 
funds. The fund is meant to generate stable growth and has a long time-horizon, providing 
pensions for employees when they reach retirement. 
Principal-Agent Relationship: This relates to an arrangement where one entity legally 
appoints another to act on its behalf. In a business setting, the agent will typically be the 
company’s management while the principal are the shareholders. The relationship is 
determined using written contracts, so that the agent will act in the principal’s best interest. 
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Private Equity fund: A private equity fund uses a cash pool raised from retail- and 
institutional investors to invest directly into companies. This is done in several ways with 
direct investments in private companies and leveraged buyouts of listed companies being 
among the most common. The time horizon of such an investment is typically 4-7 years, 
after which the target either is sold off or (re)listed. 
Risk aversion: This relates to how willing an investor is to take on risk. We usually 
distinguish between three different degrees of risk tolerance: A risk averse investor will, 
when faced with two investments with a similar expected return, prefer the one with the 
lower risk. A risk loving investor is willing to take on additional risk for an investment that 
has a relatively low expected return. Finally, a risk neutral investor is indifferent if 
investments have the same expected return. 
Spillover effects: Spillover effects can be thought of as externalities of economic activity, 
and in our case it is associated with international owners that potentially could bring with 
them for example advanced technology. 
Strategic ownership: Related to ownership by other companies, which through the 
ownership seek to secure some sort of competitive advantage. This can be related to benefits 
such as cost reductions through strategic alliances or diversification. 
Turnover Rate: The turnover rate is the number of shares traded annually, as a percentage of 
all outstanding shares. It will be a good indicator of the company’s liquidity, but should be 
seen in connection with the number of free-floating shares. 
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Appendix 2: Peer Group 
In the following we have provided a brief description of the companies in the peer group: 
Marine Harvest (MHG): 
Marine Harvest is the world’s largest farmer of Atlantic salmon, supplying 25% of the global 
harvesting volume. The company has operations in 18 countries and is by far the largest 
seafood company in terms of market value, being priced at NOK 26,029 million. 
Lerøy Seafood (LSG):  
Lerøy Seafood Group is engaged in both farming and processing of salmon, trout and some 
other species. The Group has subsidiaries in several European countries and is an important 
player within the aquaculture industry. The company’s market capitalization of NOK 9,765 
million is fairly similar to that of Cermaq. 
SalMar (SALM):  
SalMar focuses on the production of Atlantic salmon and has a large harvesting and value 
adding processing facility in Norway where the company also is headquartered. The 
company is also engaged in operations outside Norway, with ownership in Bakkafrost and 
fish farms in Scotland. In terms of size, the company has a market capitalization of NOK 
8,057 million. 
Norway Royal Salmon (NRS): 
Norway Royal Salmon has operations ranging from smolt production to harvesting. The 
company operates in Norway where it currently holds 25 licenses for farming of salmon. 
Through an in-house sales organization SalMar supplies salmon to 50 countries. 
Austevoll Seafood (AUSS): 
Austevoll Seafood is among the world’s largest producers of fishmeal and fish oil. In 
addition, the company is engaged in farming and processing activities in several countries. 
Austevoll currently holds 125 salmon farming licenses in Norwa, and has a market 
capitalization of NOK 7,075 million. 
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Grieg Seafood (GSF): 
Grieg Seafood is an integrated aquaculture company headquartered in Bergen, with 
operations in Norway, Canada and the UK. The company focuses on farming and processing 
of salmon and trout, and has a market capitalization of NOK 1,998 million. 
Bakkafrost (BAKKA): 
Bakkafrost is vertically integrated seafood company and is engaged in all stages of the value 
chain, from the production of fish feed and farming to value added products. The company is 
located on the Faroe Islands and has market capitalization of NOK 4,336 million. 
Havfisk (HFISK): 
Havfisk is a harvesting company with several vessels operating in Norwegian coastal 
territories. Neither being engaged in fish feed or harvesting, Havfisk is not among the most 
comparable companies, but we believe it will provide the peer group with some much 
needed diversity, as companies engaged in fish farming are overrepresented. As Cermaq up 
until now mainly has been a fish feed company, this could possibly provide us with more 
reliable results. Havfisk is among the smallest companies on the Oslo Seafood Index, with a 
market capitalization of no more than NOK 685 million.  
Scottish Salmon Company (SSC): 
Scottish Salmon Company is the leading producer of Scottish salmon and accounts for more 
than 20 percent of the total Scottish salmon production. The company operates more than 40 
fish farms and has a market capitalization of NOK 689 million. 
Copeinca (COP): 
Copeinca is a Peruvian producer of fishmeal and fish oil. The company is closely related to 
Cermaq in terms of operations, but being located in Peru the Copeinca the business climate 
is different. The companyis listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and has a market capitalization of 
NOK 4,756 million. 
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Appendix 3: Share Performance 
Figure A2.1: CEQ Share Performance 
Note: CEQ’s absolute share performance from 03.11.2008 until 03.11.2013. Quotes are obtained from Oslo Stock Exchange. 
Figure A2.2: Cermaq vs. Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) 
 
Note: CEQ’s share performance versus Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index, rebased at 100 as of 01.11.2008. OSEBX is an investable 
index consisting of a representative sample of all shares listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. OSEBX is revised 01.12 and 01.06 each year 
and is adjusted for free-floating shares and dividends. 
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Figure A2.3: Cermaq vs. Oslo Seafood Index (OSLSFX) 
 
Note: CEQ’s share performance versus Oslo Seafood Index, rebased at 100 as of 26.06.2010. OSLSFX consists as of 01.11.13 of 14 
companies operating within the seafood sector: AKVA Group (AKVA), Austevoll Seafood (AUSS), Bakkafrost (BAKKA), Cermaq 
(CEQ), Domstin (DOM), Grieg Seafood (GSF), Hofseth BioCare (HBC), Havfisk (HFISK), Learøy Seafood Group (LSG), Marine Harvest 
(MHG), Norway Royal Salmon (NRS), SalMar (SALM), The Scottish Salmon Company (SSC) and Sølvtrans (STRANS). The index 
includes listings on Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo Axess and is adjusted for company-specific events and dividends on a daily basis. 
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Appendix 4: Case Study 
Figure A3.1: CEQ Share Performance in the Period of 01.04.13-30.06.13 
 
Summary and Timeline 
On the 30
th
 of April 2013, Marine Harvest announced an offer to acquire all outstanding 
shares in Cermaq. This marked the beginning of a couple of turbulent months resulting in 
Cermaq selling of its fish feed business (EWOS) to Altor and Bain Capital. We will in the 
following supply a brief, chronological overview of the entire process: 
30.04 Marine Harvest offers NOK 105 per share in Cermaq with the purpose of 
“creating a global industry leader based upon a complete footprint along the 
Norwegian coast”. The offer represents a 22% premium above the Cermaq 
closing price. 
02.05 Cermaq’s Board of Directors unanimously concludes that the bid by Marine 
Harvest does not reflect the values and synergies of the proposal, and urges 
shareholders to support the completion of the Copeinca process. 
07.05 Marine Harvest sends an open letter to the Cermaq shareholders explaining 
their bid and why the Company thinks Copeinca would be a move in the 
wrong direction. 
MHG submits an offer of 
NOK 105 per share. 
 
Trond Giske announces that the 
government will vote against the offer by 
MHG, at Cermaq’s general meeting 
Altor and Bain submit an offer of NOK 6.2 billion for EWOS, and the Norwegian 
MInistry of Trade and Industry announces a potential acquisition of CEQ shares. 
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10.05 Cermaq sends an open letter to its shareholders, as a direct response to the 
letter sent by Marine Harvest, explaining why the Copeinca transaction is 
beneficial. 
14.05 The minister of Trade and industry, Trond Giske, announces that the 
Government will vote in favor of the Copeinca transaction at the General 
Meeting on May 21
st
.  He also states that the offer by Marine Harvest is to 
low, and that it would not be accepted. 
21.05 The Annual General Meeting in Cermaq is held and the rights issue in order 
to finance the acquisition of Copeinca does not get the required 2/3 majority 
(only 62,5%). 
23.05 The Board of Directors announces that the voluntary offer on all shares in 
Copeinca will not be completed. 
31.05 Marine Harvest announces its final bid of NOK 107 per share and claims that 
it was prepared to raise the bid even more, but that it was not possible to 
receive support from Cermaq board and management. At the same time 
Cermaq announces that the discussions have been terminated. The board 
maintains its conclusion that the new offer significantly undervalues Cermaq. 
The Company engages additional financial advisors in order to evaluate other 
strategic options 
06.06 The offer document for the voluntary offer by Marine Harvest is approved by 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
10.06 Cermaq recommends against the voluntary offer by Marine Harvest, and 
urges shareholders to await potential alternative solutions. 
17.06 Altor and Bain Capital submit an offer for EWOS, valuing the business at 
NOK 6.2 billion (enterprise value) 
20.06 The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry announces a potential 
purchase of shares in Cermaq through a reverse Dutch auction, possibly 
bringing the government’s stake to a maximum of 65.0%. 
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21.06 Expiry of the offer period for the voluntary offer by Marine Harvest, with 
acceptance below the 33.4% set as a condition. 
25.06 The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry announces that it has bought 
9.46 million shares at NOK 108, bringing its total holdings in Cermaq to 
53.77%. Up to 5 million additional shares might be purchased in the market at 
the same price. 
11.07 Extraordinary General Meeting: The General Meeting granted with more than 
2/3 majority the Board of Directors the authorization to sell all or parts of the 
company’s fish feed business EWOS. 
18.07 Definite agreement for the sale of EWOS at an enterprise value of NOK 6.5 
billion reached with Altor and Bain Capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Appendix 5: Ownership Classification 
Ownership identities 
The largest shareholder in each company at the end of a quarter, is divided into one out of 
five categories. We utilize an identification framework, provided by the Norwegian 
Statistical Agency, and published by Oslo VPS. The ownership structure of each single 
company within the peer group is found in the respective annual reports. In order to trace the 
identity of the different owners we have uses Oslo VPS Arena and forvalt.no. 
Tabell A2.1: Ownership Classification Framework 
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The first category, individual owners, includes ownership through private investment 
companies and is applicable to several of our companies. Individual ownership comprises 
family ownership, which is common within this industry. The second category, non-
financial owners, includes limited companies, quasi-corporate enterprises and non-profit 
organizations. This will usually relate to strategic ownership by other operational firms. The 
third category, financial owners, includes financial holding companies, banks, mutual funds 
etc. The fourth category, international owners, includes foreign investors and private 
investors owning shares through nominee accounts in an international registered investment 
bank. The final category, state ownership, includes ownership on both a national and 
municipal level. This means that state ownership can be organized in several ways. In our 
case, state ownership will only relate to ownership by The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. 
Justifying the Classification 
CEQ: The largest owner is, throughout the whole period, The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, with a constant ownership share of 43.5 percent. Ownership is categorized as state 
ownership. 
MHG: For the entire period, Geveran Trading Co., Ltd (GT) is the largest owner. GT is 
based in Limassol, Cyprus, and operated as a subsidiary of Greenwich Holdings Limited, 
which also is registered in Cyprus. Ownership is categorized as international ownership. 
LSG:  The largest investor was Profond AS for the period of 2005-2006.  Profond AS is a 
subsidiary of Profond Holding AS, a private limited investment company owned exclusively 
by the Lerøy family. Since 2006, the largest owner has been Austevoll Seafood ASA, a 
strategic owner operating within the same industry. Ownership is categorized as individual 
ownership for the period of 2005-2006 and non-financial ownership since 2006. 
SALM: Throughout the whole period, the largest owner in SalMar is Kverva AS. This is a 
private investment company belonging to the Witzøe family. Ownership is categorized as 
individual ownership. 
NRS:  Since 2008 the largest owner has been Gåsø Næringsutvikling AS. This company is 
owned by family members Helge Gåsø, Christine Gåsø and Amders Gåsø. Ownership is 
categorized as individual ownership. 
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AUSS:  Owned by Laco AS, the Møgster family’s private investment company. Ownership 
is categorized as individual ownership. 
BAKKA: The largest shareholder in Bakkafrost is SalMar ASA. Ownership is categorized 
as non-financial ownership. 
GSF: Grieg Seafood is majority owned by Grieg Holding AS, a private investment company 
belonging to the Grieg family. Ownership is categorized as individual ownership. 
 HFISK:   In the period of 2005-2008 the largest shareholder was Aker Seafoods Holding 
AS, a financial holding company. From 2009-2011 the largest owner was Convert Capital 
Fund AS, an investment company owned by Aker ASA.  Since 2012, the company has been 
majority owned by Aker ASA directly. Ownership is categorized as financial ownership 
throughout the whole period 
SSC: SIX SIS AG has been the largest owner in SSC during the whole period. SIX SIS AG 
is a company registered in Switzerland and since SSC operates in Scotland, ownership is 
categorized as international ownership. 
COP: Dyer Coriat Holding, the largest shareholder in Copeinca, is a private limited 
company belonging to the Peruvian Dyer Coriat family. With Copeinca itself being based in 
Peru, ownership is categorized as individual ownership. 
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Appendix 6: Correlation Matrix 
Table A6.1: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Note: Correlation Matrix explaining the correlation between all dependent-, independent- and interaction variables. Tobin’s Q (market 
value of equity and debt/total assets), ROA (net income/average total assets), the identity of the company’s largest shareholder, Herfindahl 
index (sum of squared ownership), and ownership of Top1, Top3 and Top5 largest shareholders. The insider squared is meant to pick up 
any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. The interaction variables are meant to revel the marginal effects of the different ownership 
identities. Ln mcap is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured in NOK million. Results are based on a group of 
companies, consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP.   
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Appendix 7: Impact of References and Measures 
Table A7.1: RE-Model for Tobin’s Q with Different Identities as Reference 
 (Non-financial ref) (Financial ref) (International ref) (Individual ref) 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Hf -0.084 -0.084 -0.084 -0.084 
 (0.265) (0.265) (0.265) (0.265) 
     
Insider ownership 1.662*** 1.662*** 1.662*** 1.662*** 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) 
     
Insider ownership^2 -0.624 -0.624 -0.624 -0.624 
 (0.859) (0.859) (0.859) (0.859) 
     
State 0.318 -0.456*** -0.082 0.062 
 (0.272) (0.106) (0.343) (0.225) 
     
Individual  0.256 -0.518** -0.144  
 (0.162) (0.209) (0.411)  
     
International 0.401 -0.373  0.144 
 (0.434) (0.367)  (0.411) 
     
Financial 0.774***  0.373 0.518** 
 (0.238)  (0.367) (0.209) 
     
Lnmcap 0.338*** 0.338*** 0.338*** 0.338*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
     
Non-financial  -0.774*** -0.401 -0.256 
  (0.238) (0.434) (0.162) 
     
Constant -2.016*** -1.242*** -1.615*** -1.760*** 
 (0.571) (0.415) (0.615) (0.498) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (market value equity and debt)/(tot assets). Regression 1: Non-financial owner as reference.  
Regression 2: Financial owner as reference. Regression 3: International owner as reference. Regression 4: Individual owner as reference. 
Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index is the sum of squared ownership shares for 20 largest shareholders), Insider ownership (shares 
held by members of management and the board/total shares outstanding), Insider ownership^2, Identity of largest shareholder, LnMcap (the 
natural logarithm of market cap measured in NOK million). Results are based on a group of companies, consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, 
SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. Standard errors in parentheses* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 84 
 
Table A7.2: RE-Model for ROA with Different Identities as Reference 
 (Non-financial ref) (Financial ref) (International ref) (Individual ref) 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Hf -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
     
Insider ownership 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
     
Insider ownership^2 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
     
State -0.010 -0.008 0.014** -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) 
     
Individual  -0.008 -0.006 0.016  
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)  
     
International -0.024** -0.022  -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.017)  (0.018) 
     
Financial -0.002  0.022 0.006 
 (0.010)  (0.017) (0.016) 
     
Lnmcap 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Non-financial  0.002 0.024** 0.008 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) 
     
Constant -0.035 -0.036 -0.059* -0.042 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.034) (0.036) 
Observations 199 199 199 199 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
 
Note: Dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) (net income)/(average total assets). Regression 1: Non-financial owner as reference.  
Regression 2: Financial owner as reference. Regression 3: International owner as reference. Regression 4: Individual owner as reference. 
Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index is the sum of squared ownership shares for 20 largest shareholders), Insider ownership (shares 
held by members of management and the board/total shares outstanding), Insider ownership^2, Identity of largest shareholder, LnMcap (the 
natural logarithm of market cap measured in NOK million). Results are based on a group of companies, consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, 
SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP.  Standard errors in parentheses* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table A7.3 RE-Model (Tobin’s Q) with Different Concentration Measures 
 (1. HF) (2. Top 3 owners) (3. Top 5 owners) 
  Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Hf -0.084   
 (0.265)   
    
Top3ownership  -0.411  
  (0.326)  
    
Top5ownership   -0.260 
   (0.332) 
    
Insider ownership 1.662*** 1.291*** 1.477*** 
 (0.269) (0.218) (0.250) 
    
Insider ownership^2 -0.624 0.099 -0.217 
 (0.859) (0.807) (0.868) 
    
State 0.318 0.234 0.274 
 (0.272) (0.254) (0.246) 
    
Individual  0.256 0.178 0.220 
 (0.162) (0.191) (0.177) 
    
International 0.401 0.315 0.355 
 (0.434) (0.456) (0.440) 
    
Financial 0.774*** 0.782*** 0.782*** 
 (0.238) (0.222) (0.233) 
    
Lnmcap 0.338*** 0.335*** 0.338*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
    
Constant -2.016*** -1.700*** -1.832*** 
 (0.571) (0.588) (0.634) 
Observations 199 199 199 
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.213 0.195 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q (market value equity and debt)/(tot assets). Regression 1: Non-financial owner as reference.  
Regression 2: Financial owner as reference. Regression 3: International owner as reference. Regression 4: Individual owner as reference. 
Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index is the sum of squared ownership shares for 20 largest shareholders), Ownership share of Top3 
and Top5 largest shareholders, Insider ownership (shares held by members of management and the board/total shares outstanding), Insider 
ownership^2, Identity of largest shareholder, LnMcap (the natural logarithm of market cap measured in NOK million). Results are based on 
a group of companies, consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. Standard errors in 
parentheses* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Appendix 8: Periodic Random Effects Model 
Table A8.1: Cyclical RE-Model; Effects on Tobin’s Q in Different Business Cycles 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Tobin’s Q, 2006-2008 Tobin’s Q, 2009-2011 Tobin’s Q, 2006-2011 
Hf -0.386 -0.348 0.021 
 (0.745) (0.594) (0.260) 
    
Insider ownership 1.688 -0.148 1.267** 
 (2.958) (0.882) (0.531) 
    
Insider ownership^2 0.266 0.797 0.249 
 (4.550) (1.190) (0.970) 
    
State 0.304 -0.265 0.010 
 (0.703) (0.511) (0.503) 
    
LnMcap 0.522*** 0.260*** 0.343*** 
 (0.073) (0.039) (0.029) 
    
Constant -3.390*** -0.800* -1.778*** 
 (0.761) (0.444) (0.306) 
Observations 51 84 132 
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.246 0.304 
 
Note: Regression 1: peak to trough. Regression 2: trough to peak. Regression 3: peak to peak. The results for the dependent 
variableTobin’s Q (market value of equity and debt/total assets) using all other owners as reference. Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl 
index, sum of squared ownership top 20 owners) Insider ownership is measured as fraction shares owned by the board and management. 
The insider squared is meant to pick up any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. State is the only ownership identity variable. Ln mcap is 
the natural logarithm of the companies’ market capitalization measured in million NOK. Results are based on a group of companies, 
consisting of CEQ, MHG, LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP.  Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .10, ** p 
< .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table A8.2: Cyclical RE-Mode; Effects on ROA in Different Business Cycles 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  ROA, 2006-2008 ROA, 2009-2011 ROA 2006-2011 
Hf -0.040 -0.030 0.020 
 (0.029) (0.061) (0.041) 
    
Insider ownership 0.170*** -0.085 -0.041 
 (0.060) (0.128) (0.086) 
    
Insider ownership^2 -0.250** 0.184 0.055 
 (0.103) (0.199) (0.150) 
    
State 0.025*** -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.032) 
    
Lnmcap -0.002 0.014** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
    
Constant 0.022 -0.078 -0.122*** 
 (0.048) (0.057) (0.043) 
Observations 51 84 132 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.104 0.126 
 
Note: Regression 1: peak to trough. Regression 2: trough to peak. Regression 3: peak to peak. The results for the dependent variable ROA 
(net income/average total assets) using all other owners as reference. Explanatory variables: Hf (Herfindahl index, sum of squared 
ownership top 20 owners) Insider ownership is measured as fraction shares owned by the board and management. The insider squared is 
meant to pick up any nonlinear effects of insider ownership. State is the only ownership identity variable. Ln mcap is the natural logarithm 
of the companies’ market capitalization measured in million NOK. Results are based on a group of companies, consisting of CEQ, MHG, 
LSG, SALM, NRS, AUSS, BAKKA, GSF, HFISK, SSC and COP. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Appendix 9: Capital Structure 
Figure A9.1: Debt Ratio 
 
Note: The debt ratio is defined as the total book value of debt divided by the total assets, and can be understood as the share of the 
company’s assets that is financed using debt. We have computed an average, including all companies except CEQ, as well as the max/min 
band displaying the variation. The median is based on all companies (including CEQ). 
 
Figure A9.2: Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
 
Note: The debt to equity ratio is defined as total book value of debt divided by stockholders equity and can be understood as the 
proportions of equity and debt the company uses to finance its assets. We have computed an average, including all companies except CEQ, 
as well as ta max/min band displaying the variation. The median is based on all companies (including CEQ). 
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Appendix 10: Dividend Policy 
Figure A10.1: Annual Payout Ratio 
 
Note: Annual Payout Ratio, defined as dividends paid as a percentage of net income. The average includes all companies within the peer-
group excluding Cermaq and Copeinca. For the latter, large and irregular dividend payments combined with a low net income resulted in 
sky-high payout ratios indicating that the dividend policy is not necessarily connected to the level of profits. We have therefore excluded it 
from our sample as it only adds noise that manipulates the average. 
 
Figure A.10.2: Average 3 Year Trailing Payout Ratio 
 
Note: Payout Ratio calculated as a 3 year trailing average. This will have a smoothing effect, giving a better impression of how the 
dividend policy has evolved over time. We have, also in this case, excluded Cermaq and Copeinca from the calculated average. The high 
initial average is biased by unusually large dividend payments in Havfisk and Norway Royal Salmon, but will converge towards a more 
normalized level, close to that of Cermaq. 
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Figure A10.3: Aggregate Payout Ratio 
 
Note: The payout ratio based on aggregated dividend payments and net aggregated income. This will provide us with a more nuanced 
picture, since dividend payments will be dependent on the company’s overall financial position, and not only current year’s profits. Cermaq 
and Copeinca are excluded from the average. 
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Appendix 11: Executive Remuneration 
Figure A11.1: Executive Remuneration Policies 
 
Note: Policies regarding executive remuneration for Cermaq, Marine Harvest, Lerøy Seafood Group and SalMar. Bonus limit is the 
maximum cash bonus, measured as a percentage of the annual base salary. Option scheme is whether the company practices option 
programs where executive managers are given options. The same analogy goes for share programs. Severance limit is the maximum 
amount which can be given as severance payment, measured as the normal monthly salary. All numbers are gathered from the respective 
2012 Annual Reports. 
Cermaq 
Cermaq’s executive remuneration and bonus schemes are based on recommendations from a 
remuneration committee. The company pays a variable salary to senior management but this 
has been limited to 30 percent of the annual base salary. The company established an option 
scheme in 2006, in which 38 individuals are still involved. None of the directors have any 
share-based remuneration agreements. 
Marine Harvest 
Marine Harvest’s executive remuneration program includes fixed salaries, bonus, benefits in 
kind, pension, severance pay and a share based incentive schemes. The cash bonus is linked 
to both group targets (70%) and individual achievements (30%) and is in the case of the 
CEO capped at 50 percent of the fixed salary. The share price based scheme assigns each 
individual entitled to bonus a number of calculatory units corresponding to Marine Harvest 
shares with a specific base value. 3 years after allotment the recipient is paid a cash bonus 
determined by the difference between current share price and the base value, which must be 
invested in MHG shares at market value and held for at least 12 months before being sold. 
This bonus amount is for each individual limited to 2 years salary. 
Lerøy Seafood Group 
In addition to the annual salary, Lerøy Seafoood also pays performance-based bonuses, lump 
sum payments, sign-on fees, arranged leave of absence, educational opportunities and option 
agreements. There are no limits to non-pecuniary benefits and employees have in the case of 
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public share issues been offered a limited number of shares at a 20 percent discount. The 
company has traditionally utilized option schemes, but currently there are no outstanding 
option agreements. The base salary is considered the main element of the senior executive’s 
salary, and performance-based bonuses have been limited to one year’s salary. Severance 
pay is capped at two years salary. 
SalMar 
SalMar’s compensation of executive managers is divided into three and comprises a fixed 
salary, a performance-related bonus and a share option scheme. Annual performance-based 
bonuses are capped at a half-year’s salary. The company utilizes forms of remuneration that 
involves senior executives receiving shares, subscription rights or option. Severance pay is 
limited to a period of 6-12 months. 
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